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Free Expression, In-Group Bias, and the 
Court’s Conservatives: A Critique of the 
Epstein-Parker-Segal Study 
TODD E. PETTYS† 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 6, 2014, the New York Times reported on a new 
study1 conducted by three prominent political scientists—
Professors Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, and Christopher 
Parker—concerning Supreme Court justices’ voting patterns 
in First Amendment free-expression cases.2 After analyzing 
all such cases decided between the Court’s 1953 and 2010 
terms, the study’s authors determined that there is evidence 
of pervasive in-group bias on the Court, with “the justices’ 
votes tend[ing] to reflect their preferences toward the 
  
† H. Blair and Joan V. White Chair in Civil Litigation, University of Iowa College 
of Law. Many thanks to Sheila Barron, Stephanos Bibas, Arthur Bonfield, Mary 
Campbell, Andy Grewal, Tim Hagle, Anna Harvey, Steve Hitlin, Herb 
Hovenkamp, David Hyman, Mark Osiel, Eric Posner, Jennifer Puryear, Michael 
Saks, Carolyn Shapiro, and Caroline Sheerin for either reading drafts or talking 
with me about portions of this Article. 
 1. See Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jeffrey A. Segal, Do Justices 
Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First 
Amendment (on file with author), available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/
research/InGroupBias.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). The authors presented the 
study at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. 
See id. at n.*. 
 2. See Adam Liptak, For Justices, Free Speech Often Means ‘Speech I Agree 
With’, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2014, at A15.  
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speakers’ ideological grouping.”3 The authors found that the 
justices are more likely to support speakers’ legal claims 
when the expression at issue “conforms to [the justices’ own] 
values”4 and “are much less apt to protect expression rights 
when the expresser is from the opposing ideological team.”5 
The authors also reported that the members of the 
Roberts Court are not equal ideological offenders. The four 
current justices who proved most likely to vote in favor of 
ideologically likeminded speakers during the study’s time 
period, the authors told the New York Times, are the Court’s 
most conservative members: Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.6 The authors supported 
that indictment with a chart,7 listing all Roberts Court 
justices (current and former) in order from most conservative 
to most liberal, excluding the Court’s two most recent 
appointees (Justices Sotomayor and Kagan) on the grounds 
that those justices had not yet cast votes in a statistically 
meaningful number of free-expression cases.8 The authors 
  
 3. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 2. Using the Supreme Court Database, the 
authors identified 516 cases that fell within the study’s time parameters. See id. 
at 7; see generally About, SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/
about.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). 
 4. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 3. 
 5. Id. at 16.  
 6. See Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jeffrey A. Segal, Do Justices 
Defend the Speech They Hate? 4 (May 2, 2014) [hereinafter Summary] (on file with 
author), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBiasSummary.pdf; see also 
Lee Epstein: Research, WASH. U. ST. LOUIS, http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/
InGroupBias.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (stating that the document was 
“prepared for the New York Times”). Liberal justices did not emerge from the 
study unscathed. Among past justices, for example, Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Stevens, and Warren all were found to have statistically significant disparities in 
their support for conservative and liberal speakers. See Summary, supra, at 7. 
 7. Summary, supra note 6, at 5. 
 8. Id. at 4-5. The authors placed the justices along the conservative-liberal 
spectrum by assigning them Segal-Cover scores. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, 
at 8; see also Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes 
of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559-63 (1989) 
(proposing that justices’ ideological values be ascertained by analyzing pre-
confirmation newspaper editorials in left-leaning and right-leaning national 
newspapers); see generally LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY 
OF RATIONAL CHOICE 73-74 (2013) [hereinafter EPSTEIN ET AL., BEHAVIOR OF 
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used an asterisk to indicate those justices for whom the 
difference in support for conservative and liberal speakers 
was statistically significant. The resulting array follows: 
 









Thomas* 23.1 65.4 104 
Scalia* 20.7 65.2 161 
Alito* 9.1 53.9 24 
Roberts* 15.4 64.3 27 
Kennedy* 43.2 67.7 143 
O’Connor* 30.6 50.7 190 
Breyer 40.0 38.1 87 
Souter 60.3 51.1 103 
Ginsburg 53.2 40.0 92 
Stevens* 62.8 46.9 260 
Table A: The Authors’ Report on the Roberts Court Justices 
  
The authors’ findings—particularly those concerning the 
Court’s conservatives—received wide attention in the press 
and in the blogosphere. Adam Liptak opened his coverage for 
the New York Times by using the study to debunk the notion 
that Justice Scalia is “a consistent and principled defender of 
free speech rights,” writing that “Justice Scalia voted to 
uphold the free speech rights of conservative speakers at 
more than triple the rate of liberal ones.”9 Salon covered the 
study under the title Scalia’s Free Speech Hypocrisy: What a 
New Study Proves About His Bias.10 A writer for The 
Economist used the study to condemn ideologically motivated 
  
FEDERAL JUDGES] (briefly discussing the strengths and weaknesses of relying 
upon Segal-Cover scores for such purposes). 
 9. Liptak, supra note 2. 
 10. Elias Isquith, Scalia’s Free Speech Hypocrisy: What a New Study Proves 
About His Bias, SALON (May 15, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/05/
15/scalias_free_speech_hypocrisy_what_a_new_study_proves_about_his_bias.  
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voting by conservative and liberal justices alike, but 
emphasized that “the Supreme Court’s current liberal and 
conservative wings are not—not remotely—equally 
implicated in the shady free-speech-for-my-friends racket,” 
because “the righties on today’s court appear to be 
significantly guiltier of in-group bias than are their liberal 
colleagues.”11 Under the headline Conservative Court’s Free 
Speech Rulings Drenched in Biases, a writer for the website 
Common Dreams said the study shows that “conservative 
members of the court are tied much tighter to their own 
political and ideological biases than the liberal justices when 
it comes to ruling on cases concerning free speech.”12 One 
blogger said the study demonstrates that “[t]he in-group bias 
of the conservative justices is far more prevalent and they are 
much more likely to support only speech that they agree 
with.”13 Another declared that the study provides “yet 
another example of how the Supreme Court has become 
rigged to favor conservatives.”14 Many of these writers’ 
readers presumably saw things the same way. 
The story here has as much to do with those who write 
and read about the Court as it does with those who serve on 
it. The study’s conclusions are stunning—particularly the 
uniformity of those conclusions regarding the Court’s current 
conservatives—because they appear to strike a devastating 
blow to the Court’s integrity as an institution that claims 
fidelity to the rule of law. Given those profound implications, 
the credulity with which some have uncritically accepted all 
of the study’s results at face value is remarkable. One 
  
 11. S.M., Playing Favourites, THE ECONOMIST (May 13, 2014, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/05/judicial-bias. 
 12. Jon Queally, Conservative Court’s Free Speech Rulings Drenched in Biases, 
COMMON DREAMS (May 6, 2014), https://www.commondreams.org/headline/
2014/05/06-0. 
 13. Ed Brayton, Conservative Justices Far More Biased on Free Speech, 
FREETHOUGHT BLOGS (May 7, 2014), http://freethoughtblogs.com/dispatches/2014/
05/07/conservative-justices-far-more-biased-on-free-speech. 
 14. David Badash, Report Proves Scalia Most Likely to Side with Conservative 
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wonders whether those who speedily embraced the study 
would have been as quick to do so if the Court’s current 
liberals had uniformly been the ones coming out looking the 
worst. As I will explain,15 the very same in-group biases that 
the study’s authors attribute to the justices can make 
laypeople and scholars alike particularly credulous when 
presented with arguments that categorically cast their 
ideological opponents in an unflattering light. 
The ease with which many have accepted the study’s 
blanket critique of today’s conservative justices would be of 
no consequence if that critique could readily withstand a 
more patient review. Based upon an analysis of the authors’ 
evidence against Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, 
however, my judgment is that it cannot.16 The accuracy of at 
least some of the authors’ findings is undercut by a mixture 
of coding errors, superficial case readings, and questionable 
classifications of many speakers’ ideological affiliations. 
Those defects influenced the themes that emerged in the 
press’s and public’s consumption of the authors’ conclusions. 
I begin in Part I.A by briefly explaining the phenomenon 
of in-group bias. Then, in Part I.B, I describe the means by 
which Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal said they 
determined speakers’ ideological identities in each of the 
cases within their study. In Part I.C, I introduce readers to 
the possibility that something is amiss by discussing 
problems in the authors’ handling of the Court’s 2008 ruling 
in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican 
Party.17  
  
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. For a similarly skeptical critique of the study, see Eugene Volokh, The 
Justices, the Freedom of Speech, and Ideology, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 13, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/13/
the-justices-the-freedom-of-speech-and-ideology (concluding that the study “does 
not, I think, support its conclusion, precisely because it classifies speakers as 
‘liberal speakers’ or ‘conservative speakers’ for reasons other than the ‘ideological 
grouping’ of the speaker or the speech”). If anything, Volokh argues, the study 
simply supports the comparatively unremarkable conclusion that “[c]onservative 
Justices tend to be persuaded by conservative arguments (not necessarily 
conservative speakers’ arguments) for why a law should be upheld (or struck 
down), and likewise for liberal Justices.” Id. 
 17. 552 U.S. 442 (2008). 
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In Part II, I identify many instances in which the authors 
either coded cases improperly or made readily debatable 
judgments about speakers’ ideological affiliations. Drawing 
upon Part II’s discussion of cases and coding decisions, I turn 
in Part III to the authors’ appraisal of the free-expression 
votes of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito—two 
conservatives whose comparatively slim records are readily 
susceptible to a comprehensive reassessment. The evidence 
of in-group bias in those two justices’ chambers is far weaker 
than the authors reported. The evidence of bias in Justice 
Alito’s chambers might actually be non-existent, while—
depending on what one makes of his votes in campaign-
finance cases—the evidence of bias in Chief Justice Roberts’s 
chambers might rest upon just a vote or two in a tiny data 
pool. 
In Part IV, I invoke the literature on motivated reasoning 
and in-group bias to explain why some might be willing to 
quickly embrace a study that yields a uniformly damning 
report on the Court’s currently sitting conservatives. I 
conclude in Part V by arguing for greater rigor in empirical 
analyses of the justices’ ideological voting patterns; by 
suggesting that the problems with this particular study raise 
important concerns regarding the publicly available 
Supreme Court Database, the data-handling norms that 
generally prevail among those who do empirical work of this 
sort, or both; and by discussing the chief challenge that needs 
to be resolved before launching future large-scale studies of 
the justices’ tendency toward ideological in-group bias. I close 
by briefly commenting on the authors’ problem-compounding 
response to this Article’s critique of their study. 
I. THE EPSTEIN-PARKER-SEGAL STUDY 
Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal aimed to break 
new ground, examining for the first time the influence that 
in-group biases might wield when Supreme Court justices 
cast votes in the cases that come before them. The authors 
chose to focus their inquiry on First Amendment free-
expression cases—that is, cases involving the freedoms of 
2015] EPSTEIN-PARKER-SEGAL CRITIQUE 7 
speech, press, assembly, and association.18 For each of the 
cases that fell within the time parameters of their study, the 
authors had to confirm that the dispute did indeed concern 
the First Amendment, they had to determine the ideological 
affiliations of the speakers or their speech,19 and they had to 
determine how each of the then-sitting justices voted. Each 
of those tasks—particularly the second—proved problematic. 
A. In-Group Bias 
As Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal explain, in-
group bias is the tendency to favor those who belong to one’s 
own group and to disfavor those who do not.20 Researchers 
have located this tendency both when the groups play 
meaningful roles in people’s lives (such as claiming one 
country rather than another as one’s own)21 and when the 
groups are manufactured by researchers on entirely random 
grounds (such as dividing people with the toss of a coin).22 
Even in the latter instances, when the criteria for 
determining group membership have no relation to otherwise 
meaningful similarities or differences, researchers find that 
individuals behaviorally and attitudinally favor those they 
regard as their own.23 Scholars have advanced a number of 
  
 18. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 2 n.6. Although the authors did not say 
so, they also included at least one case involving the freedom of petition. See infra 
notes 111-18, 222-28 and accompanying text (discussing the authors’ problematic 
handling of Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011)); see generally 
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 19. The authors did not explain how they would handle a case in which a liberal 
speaker produced conservative speech, or vice versa. See infra Part II.E. 
 20. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 1.  
 21. See HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES: STUDIES IN 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 187-90 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1981) (discussing 
experiments with children from several different countries). 
 22. See id. at 234. 
 23. See, e.g., Yan Chen & Sherry Xin Li, Group Identity and Social Preferences, 
99 AM. ECON. REV. 431, 448 (2009); see also Miles Hewstone et al., Intergroup 
Bias, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 575, 576 (2002) (“Bias can encompass behavior 
(discrimination), attitude (prejudice), and cognition (stereotyping).”). Tolerance of 
in-group members is not, however, unlimited. See Scott Eidelman & Monica 
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theories to explain this feature of our social lives.24 Some 
theorists posit, for example, that favoring in-groups and 
disfavoring out-groups are means by which we try to enhance 
our own prestige and self-esteem.25 Others argue that 
identifying strongly with one group and rejecting 
identification with another can help reduce one’s 
uncertainties about how to behave in the world at large.26 
Whatever its causes, the phenomenon is unquestionably real. 
As Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal write, “[o]f all the 
manifestations of social identity, in-group bias (or favoritism) 
may be among the most central—and best documented.”27 
In one of many laboratory studies, for example, 
researchers gave test subjects a set of lottery tickets and 
asked them to divide the tickets between themselves and an 
anonymous individual.28 In one variation, subjects were told 
that the unknown individual was a registered Democrat and 
in another they were told that the would-be recipient was a 
registered Republican. The researchers found that 
Democrats and Republicans alike were more generous with 
individuals they believed to be members of their own political 
party. The stronger the subject’s own self-identification as a 
  
Biernat, Derogating Black Sheep: Individual or Group Protection?, 39 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 602, 602-06 (2003) (arguing that individuals 
harshly judge in-group members who threaten the clarity and positivity of the 
group’s identity). 
 24. Hewstone et al., supra note 23, at 580-83 (identifying five theories that 
have emerged in the literature). 
 25. See Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup 
Conflict, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33, 40 (William G. 
Austin & Stephen Worchel eds., 1979). 
 26. See, e.g., Michael A. Hogg, Uncertainty, Social Identity, and Ideology, in 22 
SOC. IDENTIFICATION IN GROUPS 203, 209-15 (Shane R. Thye & Edward J. Lawler 
eds., 2005). 
 27. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 3; accord David G. Rand et al., Dynamic 
Remodeling of In-Group Bias During the 2008 Presidential Election, 106 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6187, 6187 (2009) (“In-group favoritism, or solidarity, is a well-
documented aspect of human behavior. People give members of their own group 
preferential treatment, and often discriminate against members of other groups.”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 28. James H. Fowler & Cindy D. Kam, Beyond the Self: Social Identity, 
Altruism, and Political Participation, 69 J. POL. 813, 814 (2007). 
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Democrat or Republican, the less favorably he or she treated 
the other party’s members.29 
B. The Authors’ Classification of Speakers’ Ideological 
Affiliations 
Launching “the first full-blown test of ideological in-
group bias in the judicial context,”30 Professors Epstein, 
Parker, and Segal hypothesized that the justices’ “votes are 
neither reflexively pro- or anti- the First Amendment but 
rather pro- or anti- the speaker’s ideological enclave.”31 They 
suspected, in other words, that the “justices are opportunistic 
free speechers,” tending to support the First Amendment 
claims of speakers they regard as ideological allies and to 
oppose the claims of speakers they regard as ideological 
adversaries.32 To test that theory, the authors had to make 
judgments about the identity of the “speaker’s ideological 
team”33 in each of the free-expression cases that fell within 
the study’s time period. The authors evidently did not find 
that task difficult. Two of the authors independently coded 
the speakers’ ideologies in all of the cases decided between 
the 2005 and 2010 terms.34 Finding that “[t]here was almost 
no disagreement in their codings,” one of the authors then 
coded the many remaining cases in the study, using the 
criteria that the authors believed they shared.35 They 
explained those criteria as follows: 
The idea here is to assess the ideological grouping of the speaker—
such that anti-gay or pro-life expressers, to provide two examples, 
are coded as “conservative” speakers . . . . This variable is 
  
 29. See id. at 824; see also id. at 815 (“[S]ocial identity theory suggests that 
individuals gain utility from affiliating with social groups, from bestowing 
benefits upon the ingroup, and from withholding benefits from the outgroup.”). 
 30. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 4. 
 31. Id. at 6. 
 32. Id. at 3; see also id. at 6 (hypothesizing that the justices “engage in 
opportunistic behavior following from litigant favoritism”). 
 33. See id. at 6. 
 34. Id. at 10 n.17. 
 35. Id.; see also Email from Christopher Parker to Todd E. Pettys (May 27, 
2014, 10:05 CST) (on file with author) (describing the coding procedure). 
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liberal . . . if the speakers were students espousing liberal causes, 
war protestors burning American flags, or donors providing support 
to or associating with left-wing organizations, and so on.36 
In the examples that the authors provide, the accuracy of 
their classifications seems clear enough. Two of their three 
illustrations of liberal speakers, for example, are people 
espousing or associating with “liberal” or “left-wing” causes—
it’s hard to disagree with illustrations that incorporate the 
very term being illustrated. But what about other cases? How 
much ambiguity lies beneath those three closing words “and 
so on”? In his coverage for the New York Times, Adam Liptak 
acknowledged that “[t]here may be quibbles about how [the 
study’s authors] coded individual votes,” but he said that it 
“usually [is not] hard to assign an ideological direction to 
particular speakers or positions.”37 Is it really true that those 
who are skeptical of some of the study’s conclusions can raise 
nothing more than quibbles? 
Before proceeding to address that question in the balance 
of this Article, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider 
the heavy weight that the authors’ brief explanation-by-
examples must carry. In a 2002 article in the University of 
Chicago Law Review, Professors Epstein and Gary King 
elaborated on ways in which, in their judgment, “the current 
state of empirical legal scholarship is deeply flawed.”38 They 
persuasively argued that, among other things, “[g]ood 
empirical work adheres to the replication standard: another 
researcher should be able to understand, evaluate, build on, 
and reproduce the research without any additional 
information from the author.”39 By providing only a brief 
description of how they assessed whether speakers were 
liberal or conservative—a description that relies entirely 
  
 36. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 10. 
 37. Liptak, supra note 2. 
 38. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 
(2002). 
 39. Id. at 38; see also id. (stating that researchers should “provide 
information . . . sufficient to replicate the results in principle”); Frank Cross et 
al., Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 137 
(2002) (“The ability of scholars to replicate each other’s work independently is a 
central component of the scholarly enterprise, and it is one that Epstein and King 
rightly emphasize.”).  
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upon uncontroversial examples—Professors Epstein, Parker, 
and Segal appear to assure the reader that most speakers’ 
predominantly conservative or liberal affiliations can easily 
be determined by anyone with a reasonable grasp on those 
ideological concepts. 
That assurance becomes even more significant when one 
considers other features of strong empirical work. In their 
2002 article, Professors Epstein and King stressed the 
importance of ensuring that one’s empirical research is both 
reliable and valid—reliable in the sense that “a measure . . . 
produces the same results repeatedly regardless of who or 
what is actually doing the measuring,”40 and valid in the 
sense that a reliable measure accurately “reflects the 
underlying concept being measured.”41 (They usefully give 
the example of a bathroom scale: it is reliable if I step on it 
many times in a row and it repeatedly indicates the same 
weight, and it is valid if the weight it indicates is accurate.)42 
Replicability and reliability are related in important ways, 
with conceptual vagueness often lying at the heart of any 
difficulties concerning the two. “[W]hen researchers produce 
measures that others cannot replicate,” Professors Epstein 
and King explained, “it is the researchers’ problem: they, not 
the replicators, must take responsibility. . . . A major source 
of unreliability in measurement is vagueness: if researchers 
cannot replicate a measure, it is probably because the 
original study did not adequately describe it.”43 
With those concerns in mind, Professors Epstein and 
King underscored the importance of limiting the latitude for 
subjective judgments when measuring a given phenomenon: 
As a rule . . . human judgment should be removed as much as 
possible from measurement or, when judgment is necessary, the 
rules underlying the judgments should be clarified enough to make 
them wholly transparent to other researchers. The key to producing 
  
 40. Epstein & King, supra note 38, at 83. 
 41. Id. at 87. 
 42. Id. at 83. 
 43. Id.; see also id. at 76 (stating that “the closer researchers can come to 
clarifying concepts so that they can measure them empirically, the better their 
tests will be”).  
12 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
reliable measures is to write down a set of very precise rules for the 
coders . . . to follow—with as little as possible left to interpretation 
and human judgment. This list should be made even if the 
investigator codes the data him- or herself, since without it others 
would not be able to replicate the research (and the 
measure) . . . . This is the way to conduct research and how it should 
be judged.44 
Judging Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal’s study by 
those standards, they give the impression that the bases for 
classifying speakers as liberal or conservative are so widely 
and consistently perceived—among conservatives and 
liberals alike—that they do not require elaboration beyond a 
few obvious examples aimed at reassuring readers that this 
is conceptual territory with which we all are familiar. They 
appear to assure their readers, in other words, that just as 
two of them agreed about how to code nearly all of the 
speakers in cases decided between the 2005 and 2010 terms,45 
we would agree with their ideological classifications of nearly 
all of the speakers in their study if we were doing the coding 
ourselves, even though the authors have not given us a 
“wholly transparent” and “very precise” set of coding rules to 
follow.46 Given the stakes that Professors Epstein and King 
described, those are remarkable assurances—and, as I will 
show, they ultimately prove ill-founded in a remarkably large 
number of instances. 
Of course, the fact that the authors did not provide their 
readers with a detailed set of coding criteria does not mean 
that they lacked such criteria altogether. Their primary 
source of guidance was the publicly available Supreme Court 
  
 44. Id. at 85. Professors Epstein and Segal have elsewhere stressed the need 
for conceptual precision when trying to measure the effects of ideology, explaining 
that researchers must make conservatism and liberalism “susceptible to 
observation” by developing “precise” definitions of those concepts. See Lee Epstein 
& Jeffrey A. Segal, Trumping the First Amendment?, 21 WASH . U. J.L. & POL’Y 
81, 87 (2006); see generally Jens B. Asendorpf et al., Recommendations for 
Increasing Replicability in Psychology, 27 EUR. J. PERSONALITY 108, 109 & n.1 
(2013) (discussing replicability and reproducibility, acknowledging that different 
disciplines use varying terms for these concepts, and stressing the need for 
subsequent researchers to have access to original researchers’ “code book”). 
 45. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
 46. Epstein & King, supra note 38, at 85. 
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Database, from which the authors derived their initial data 
set.47 The managers of that database have developed 
protocols for determining whether the Court’s treatment of 
given issues is conservative or liberal in nature and have 
used those protocols to classify more than half a century’s 
worth of Court decisions.48 Professors Epstein, Parker, and 
Segal considered those classifications when coding justices’ 
votes.49 They did not (and could not) simply apply the 
Supreme Court Database’s coding protocols to all of the cases 
in their study without making at least some categorizing 
decisions of their own,50 however, nor did they provide 
readers with an explanation of the criteria they used when 
deciding whether a given ideological classification was 
ultimately appropriate. Moreover, as I will explain in Part V, 
there are reasons to fear that the Supreme Court Database’s 
own ideological classifications are not entirely trustworthy. 
At the end of the day, therefore, Professors Epstein, Parker, 
and Segal are depending heavily upon readers’ willingness to 
embrace their implication that assigning ideological 
identities to speakers and speech is as easy as it is in the few 
  
 47. In a helpful email, one of the study’s authors explained that they used as a 
guideline the Database’s standards for determining whether the Court’s decisions 
are conservative or liberal, and that the authors caucused about how to handle 
free-expression cases that those standards did not address. Email from 
Christopher Parker to Todd E. Pettys (May 27, 2014, 11:14 CST) (on file with 
author); see generally Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 7-11 (describing their 
methodology). 
 48. See Online Code Book: Decision Direction, SUPREME COURT DATABASE, 
http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=decisionDirection (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2014). 
 49. See, e.g., Summary, supra note 6, at 2 n.4 (“For many cases (92.5% of the 
4,519 votes), our coding accords with the Database’s direction variable but there 
are notable exceptions.”). 
 50. See id. (explaining that “[t]o ensure consistency with our First Amendment 
concerns, we rechecked the coding of all votes and made alterations as 
necessary”). Although the Database’s protocols could provide a starting point in 
many cases, the authors could not simply adopt them wholesale because they 
were not designed specifically for the purpose of capturing the ideological 
affiliations of all speakers and all speech. Cf. Online Code Book: Decision 
Direction, supra note 48 (“In order to determine whether the Court supports or 
opposes the issue to which the case pertains, this variable codes the ideological 
‘direction’ of the decision.”). 
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examples that they provide. 
So, just how uncontroversial are the authors’ ideological 
classifications? Unfortunately, it does not take long for the 
close reader of their study to begin to run into difficulties. 
C. An Introduction to the Problems 
The authors’ handling of Washington State Grange v. 
Washington State Republican Party51 illustrates some of the 
kinds of problems one finds. First, the authors simplistically 
classified this as a case featuring a speaker hailing from the 
conservative enclave.52 Absent an after-the-fact explanation 
from the authors, one would surmise that they did so because 
the Washington State Republican Party prominently appears 
in the name of the case as the party challenging the 
Washington law. An “et al.” follows that reference to the 
Republicans in the case’s formal caption, however, and that 
is because the Republicans were joined in the litigation by 
the Washington State Democratic Central Committee and 
the Libertarian Party of Washington State. Those political 
parties argued that a newly adopted law concerning the 
state’s election system—a law that allowed candidates to self-
designate their party preferences on primary ballots—was 
  
 51. 552 U.S. 442 (2008). 
 52. Throughout this Article, I describe the authors’ coding decisions. The 
authors of the study initially made those decisions publicly available in an Excel 
spreadsheet posted on Professor Epstein’s faculty webpage. See Lee Epstein: 
Research, WASH. U. ST. LOUIS, http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBias.
html (first visited May 16, 2014) [hereinafter Codings] (providing a link to an 
Excel file that was posted on May 2, 2014). That version of the spreadsheet was 
removed within days of this Article being posted on SSRN, and was replaced with 
a new, more abbreviated spreadsheet. Recognizing that the authors might make 
further changes to the way in which they report their coding decisions, I simply 
cite in this Article to the version of the Excel spreadsheet that was originally 
posted on May 2, 2014. Copies of that spreadsheet are on file with me and the 
Buffalo Law Review and will be made available upon request. In that 
spreadsheet, the authors’ coding of the speakers’ ideologies appears in column I 
under the heading “speechdir” and their coding of the justices’ votes as either 
“pro-speech” or “anti-speech” appears in column E under the heading “jvote.” For 
ease of reference, I will refer to the Excel spreadsheet as “Codings” and will 
provide citations to the line numbers on which the cited coding decisions appear. 
The authors’ coding of the speakers’ ideology in Washington State Grange appears 
on line 4487. 
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facially invalid because it “compels [the political parties] to 
associate with candidates they do not endorse, alters the 
messages they wish to convey, and forces them to engage in 
counterspeech to disassociate themselves from the 
candidates and their positions on the issues.”53 The 
Republicans, Democrats, and Libertarians all appeared 
before the Court as respondents and each filed briefs 
opposing the Washington law on First Amendment grounds.54 
The fact that all three of those ideologically diverse parties 
were appearing as litigants was not lost on the Court. In his 
majority opinion, Justice Thomas explicitly noted that the 
Democrats and Libertarians joined the lawsuit soon after the 
Republicans filed their complaint,55 and he consistently 
referred to the political parties in the plural.56 With those 
three parties jointly advancing the same set of First 
Amendment arguments, there is no basis for assuming that 
the justices saw the speakers as coming from one ideological 
enclave but not the other. 
In a brief response to this critique, the authors said they 
classified the case based upon the nature of the political 
parties’ free-expression claim, rather than upon the usual 
ideological identities of the parties themselves: “Regardless 
of the participation of the Democratic Party in this case, we 
consider an argument in favor of limiting voter participation 
in elections (and therefore giving more influence to party 
elites in choosing nominees) to be a more conservative 
  
 53. Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 454. The Washington law stated “that 
candidates for office shall be identified on the ballot by their self-designated ‘party 
preference’; that voters may vote for any candidate; and that the top two 
votegetters for each office, regardless of party preference, advance to the general 
election.” Id. at 444. 
 54. See Brief for Respondent Libertarian Party of Washington, Wash. State 
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (Nos. 06-713, 06-
730); Brief for Respondent Washington State Democratic Central Committee, 
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (Nos. 
06-713, 06-730); Brief for Respondents Wash. State Republican Party et al., Wash. 
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (Nos. 06-713, 
06-730). 
 55. See Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 448. 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 449, 452-53, 458-59. 
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argument (entrenched interests).”57 That explanation 
plunges us into difficulties that will reappear elsewhere in 
this Article. First, we have quickly traveled a long distance 
from anti-gay speech and pro-life speech, the two examples of 
conservative expression that the authors provided when 
originally describing their coding criteria.58 Is there any 
reliable basis to believe that conservative justices would 
regard the Democratic, Libertarian, and Republican parties’ 
opposition to Washington’s law as a hallmark of their own 
ideological in-group, while liberal justices would regard the 
parties’ opposition as a hallmark of their ideological enemies? 
Is it really on the basis of their positions on this kind of issue 
that justices are widely regarded as liberal or conservative in 
the first place? 
Second, the authors provide no reason to be confident 
that, when it comes to ideological in-group bias in free-
expression settings, a justice will make his or her in-group 
and out-group assessments based upon the perceived 
ideological slant of the First Amendment claim, rather than 
upon the usual ideological affinity that he or she may feel for 
one or more of the claimants. As I discuss in Part II.E, trying 
to capture the justices’ ideological perceptions takes on an 
added level of speculation when, in a given case, the usual 
ideological identity of a speaker diverges from the ideological 
tenor of the speech that the speaker produces. As we will see, 
the authors themselves show evidence of resolving those 
uncertainties inconsistently, sometimes focusing on the 
speech and sometimes focusing on the speaker.59 Absent a 
persuasive response to such objections, I would regard the 
authors’ classification of Washington State Grange as 
erroneous (or, at best, as highly debatable). The justices’ 
  
 57. Appendix C (Excel version), line 4368 (Sept. 30, 2014), 
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBias.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) 
(on file with author). Appendix C is part of a set of separately posted response 
materials that Professor Epstein placed on her faculty webpage shortly after an 
earlier draft of this Article appeared on SSRN. Anticipating that the authors 
might further amend those response materials, a copy of the September 30 
version of Appendix C is on file with the author and the Buffalo Law Review and 
will be made available upon request. 
 58. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 59. See infra Part II.E. 
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votes in that case cannot reliably tell us anything about the 
justices’ ideological in-group favoritism.60 
Even if the authors accurately captured the justices’ own 
perceptions by coding the case as one involving conservative 
expression, a different coding problem caused them to state 
an exaggerated version of the empirical case against Justice 
Alito. The authors coded him as voting for the political 
parties.61 That was a mistake. Justice Alito joined Justice 
Thomas’s majority opinion rejecting the political parties’ 
claims and joined Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion 
responding to Justice Scalia’s pro-speaker dissent.62 If Justice 
Alito’s vote had been coded accurately, and if the authors had 
been correct in categorizing this as a case involving 
conservative (but not liberal) speakers, the authors would 
have reported that Justice Alito voted in favor of conservative 
speakers 46.2%—rather than 53.9%—of the time.63 
Such mistakes would not be worth much of a fuss if the 
study’s problematic treatment of Washington State Grange 
were anomalous. But when one takes a look at how the 
study’s authors handled many other cases, additional 
problems appear. Taken as a group, the number of errors and 
reasonably debatable classifications is sufficiently large that 
one ought to regard at least some of the authors’ conclusions 
with caution. 
II. ERRORS AND QUESTIONABLE CLASSIFICATIONS 
I reviewed the authors’ treatment of all cases decided 
between 1987 and the close of the study’s time period, 
amounting to 30% of the more than 500 cases in their study. 
  
 60. Accord Volokh, supra note 16 (“[H]ow can one measure whether speakers 
are ‘left or right of center’ when the case involves speech and speakers that aren’t 
particularly ideological, or that are ideological in ways that are hard to see as 
‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’—or involves a bipartisan (or multi-ideological) coalition 
of claimants?”). 
 61. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4487. 
 62. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 
(2008); id. at 459 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 63. Cf. supra Table A (summarizing the authors’ findings concerning Justice 
Alito and the other members of the Roberts Court). 
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In that review, I examined the authors’ ideological 
classifications of those cases’ First Amendment claimants 
and the authors’ coding of Chief Justice Roberts’s, Justice 
Scalia’s, and Justice Alito’s votes. The results of that review 
are troubling. Of the 159 cases I reviewed, I found one or 
more errors or readily debatable judgments in 40 cases, or in 
25% of those I examined.64 I devote a fair amount of space to 
describing those problems in the pages that follow, both to 
lay the groundwork for an evaluation of the authors’ 
treatment of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito and to 
demonstrate that researchers’ methods of gathering and 
coding data on the justices’ ideological voting patterns may 
be ripe for reevaluation.  
With varying degrees of frequency, the authors logged 
justices as voting for or against speakers in cases having 
nothing to do with free expression; they incorrectly assessed 
whether justices voted for or against First Amendment 
claimants; their conclusions about speakers’ ideological 
identities are either erroneous or subject to reasonable 
debate; they failed to come to grips with the problems that 
arise when the ideological affiliations of speakers and their 
speech diverge; they included speakers whom it is difficult to 
imagine any justice regarding as ideological teammates; and 
they double-counted at least one litigant who appeared twice 
before the Court during the course of a single lawsuit. 
A. Erroneous Inclusion of Cases Having Nothing to Do with 
Expression 
Despite their professed focus on free-expression 
litigation, the authors included at least a handful of cases in 
which there were, in fact, no First Amendment speakers.65 
The authors included Department of the Navy v. Egan66 in 
  
 64. I catalogue the problematic cases in the Appendix to this Article, infra. 
 65. The problem’s origins lie in how these cases are coded in the Supreme 
Court Database, see infra Part V (discussing limitations that afflict the Supreme 
Court Database), and in the authors’ refusal—even once made aware of the 
problem—to second-guess the way in which the database codes these cases, see 
infra notes 407-09 and accompanying text. 
 66. 484 U.S. 518 (1988). 
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their study, for example, somehow determining that the case 
was one involving a liberal speaker.67 That case had nothing 
to do with the First Amendment. Thomas Egan lost his job at 
a Navy facility when he was denied a security clearance due 
to past criminal convictions and prior problems with 
alcohol.68 The “narrow question” before the Court was 
“whether the Merit Systems Protection Board . . . has 
authority by statute to review the substance of an underlying 
decision to deny or revoke a security clearance in the course 
of reviewing an adverse action.”69 In his brief on the merits, 
Egan had framed precisely that same issue for the Court.70 It 
was not a free-expression case. 
Neither was Carlucci v. Doe,71 another case that the 
study’s authors believed featured a liberal speaker.72 As 
Justice White explained in his ruling for a unanimous Court, 
the issue was “whether the National Security Agency (NSA) 
invoked the proper statutory authority when it terminated 
respondent John Doe, an NSA employee.”73 Doe was fired 
after he “disclosed to NSA officials that he had engaged in 
homosexual relationships with foreign nationals.”74 In his 
brief to the Court, Doe framed the issue much like the Court 
itself later did: “Whether an employee of the National 
Security Agency, dismissed ‘in the interests of national 
security,’ is entitled to a hearing pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7532, 
when the summary termination authority in 50 U.S.C. 833 is 
not invoked.”75 As the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
  
 67. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1320. 
 68. Egan, 484 U.S. at 521. 
 69. Id. at 520. 
 70. See Brief for the Respondent at i, Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) 
(No. 86-1552) (“Whether, in the course of reviewing the removal of an employee 
for failure to maintain a required security clearance, the Merit Systems 
Protection Board is authorized by statute to review the substance of the 
underlying decision to deny or revoke the security clearance.”). 
 71. 488 U.S. 93 (1988). 
 72. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1388. 
 73. Carlucci, 488 U.S. at 95. 
 74. Id. at 97. 
 75. Brief for Respondent at i, Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93 (1988) (No. 87-751). 
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had explained more fully below, Doe wanted a hearing to 
develop his argument that (among other things) the decision 
to fire him was “motivated by an unconstitutional prejudice 
against homosexuals.”76 Just as one would predict from the 
question on which it had granted certiorari, the Supreme 
Court disposed of the case entirely on statutory grounds, 
saying nothing about the First Amendment. 
A similar case—again having nothing to do with free 
speech, but which the authors logged as involving a liberal 
speaker77—was Webster v. Doe.78 The Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) fired Doe after he disclosed he was gay and the 
agency concluded he posed a security risk.79 Doe filed suit, 
alleging (among other things) that the CIA had “deprived him 
of constitutionally protected rights to property, liberty, and 
privacy in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments.”80 Although he thus cited the First 
Amendment among a cluster of constitutional provisions 
giving him privacy and liberty rights, he never advanced a 
claim concerning his freedom of expression. The sole issue 
before the Court was whether the CIA’s decision to fire Doe 
was subject to judicial review under the Administrative 
Procedures Act.81 A majority of the justices concluded that 
Doe could present his constitutional claims in federal court.82 
In the ensuing lower-court proceedings, Doe advanced three 
constitutional claims: a denial of equal protection, a denial of 
his right to privacy, and a denial of “a due process property 
interest in employment.”83 The case never had anything to do 
with expressive freedoms. 
  
 76. Doe v. Weinberger, 820 F.2d 1275, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d sub nom. 
Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93 (1988). 
 77. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1280. 
 78. 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
 79. Id. at 595. 
 80. Id. at 596. 
 81. Id. at 598-99. 
 82. See id. at 601-05. 
 83. Doe v. Webster, 769 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in 
part sub nom. Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
928 (1993). 
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The fact that Egan, Carlucci, and Webster all concerned 
employees whom the government deemed security risks 
suggests that something went awry when the study’s authors 
tried to pull free-expression cases from the Supreme Court 
Database.84 Regardless of the mechanics that would explain 
why these (and possibly other85) irrelevant cases were swept 
up in the net that the authors initially cast, the authors 
should have removed them before proceeding with their 
analysis. These cases had nothing to do with the subject 
matter of the authors’ study. The authors have provided a 
discouraging yet illuminating response to this critique, which 
I will recount at the close of this Article.86 
Of course, most of the cases in the study did concern First 
Amendment free-expression claims. When examining the 
authors’ handling of those cases, however, one finds a range 
of other problems. 
B. Erroneous Coding of Justices’ Votes 
The authors sometimes failed to accurately determine 
whether justices voted for or against the First Amendment 
claimants. As I have already noted, for example, the authors 
coded Justice Alito as voting in favor of the political parties 
in Washington State Grange,87 even though he joined the 
majority opinion rejecting the political parties’ claims. 
One finds a similar set of errors in the authors’ handling 
of Beard v. Banks.88 In that case, a state prisoner objected to 
a prison policy that denied him access to newspapers, 
magazines, and photographs.89 Justice Breyer wrote for a 
four-member plurality rejecting the prisoner’s claim, with 
Justices Thomas and Scalia concurring in the judgment on 
  
 84. See supra note 3 (noting the authors’ use of the Supreme Court Database). 
 85. Again, I reviewed only 30% of the cases within the authors’ data set. 
 86. See infra notes 407-09 and accompanying text. 
 87. See supra Part I.C. 
 88. 548 U.S. 521 (2006). 
 89. See id. at 527 (plurality opinion). 
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grounds even more favorable to prison officials.90 The authors 
correctly coded the Court as a whole as voting against the 
prisoner but somehow determined that Chief Justice Roberts 
voted in the prisoner’s favor.91 That was a mistake—the Chief 
Justice joined Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion.92 In fact, the 
authors erroneously coded the votes of all of the participating 
justices in this case,93 mistakenly logging Justices Kennedy, 
Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer as voting in the speaker’s 
favor,94 while tallying Justices Stevens and Ginsburg as 
voting against him.95  
The authors’ handling of Justice Scalia provides a few 
additional illustrations. When evaluating United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc.,96 the authors determined that he voted 
against a liberal speaker.97 The case concerned the criminal 
conviction of Rubin Gottesman (X-Citement’s owner) for 
shipping in interstate commerce videotapes of actress Traci 
Lords engaging in sexually explicit conduct prior to her 
eighteenth birthday.98 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit had vacated the conviction, finding the federal 
statute at issue facially unconstitutional because it did not 
require defendants to know that recordings they were 
shipping or receiving contained minors engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct.99 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that 
the statute did indeed demand knowledge “both [of] the 
  
 90. See id. at 525 (plurality opinion) (“[W]e find, on the basis of the record now 
before us, that prison officials have set forth adequate legal support for the 
policy.”); id. at 536-37 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that only 
the Eighth Amendment constrains states’ ability to define the terms of 
imprisonment).  
 91. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4471. 
 92. See Banks, 548 U.S. at 521. 
 93. Justice Alito did not participate. 
 94. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3830 (Scalia); id. at line 4025 (Kennedy); 
id. at line 4080 (Souter); id. at line 4208 (Thomas); id. at line 4448 (Breyer). 
 95. See id. at line 3553 (Stevens); id. at line 4340 (Ginsburg). 
 96. 513 U.S. 64 (1994). 
 97. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3789. 
 98. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 66. 
 99. Id. at 67. 
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sexually explicit nature of the material and [of] the age of the 
performers.”100 Although expressing views favorable to the 
government in this general area of regulation, Justice Scalia 
dissented, taking the position that the statute could not 
reasonably bear the majority’s interpretation, that the 
properly construed statute “establishes a severe deterrent, 
not narrowly tailored to its purposes, upon fully protected 
First Amendment activities,” and that Gottesman’s 
“conviction cannot stand.”101 He voted for Gottesman, not 
against him. The authors have subsequently (and curiously) 
defended their coding of Justice Scalia’s dissent by stating 
that they were “coding votes (not opinions), in accord with a 
set of established rules.”102 It is difficult to imagine what 
worthy set of vote-focused, reality-reflecting rules would 
dictate that Justice Scalia’s vote to vacate Gottesman’s 
conviction should be logged as an anti-speaker vote. 
One finds a similar problem in the authors’ treatment of 
Pope v. Illinois.103 In that case, two attendants at an adult 
bookstore had been convicted of violating Illinois’s obscenity 
statute.104 The attendants argued that their convictions 
violated the First Amendment because the jury had not been 
properly instructed to use an objective test—rather than the 
locality’s or state’s community standards—to determine 
whether the materials at issue had serious political, artistic, 
scientific, or literary value.105 The proper remedy, the 
attendants said, would be to reverse their convictions.106 
Justice Scalia joined the Court’s majority opinion embracing 
the attendants’ First Amendment argument, rejecting the 
state’s defense of the jury instructions, and remanding for 
  
 100. Id. at 78-79. 
 101. Id. at 86 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 87 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
Court today saves a single conviction by putting in place a relatively toothless 
child-pornography law that Congress did not enact, and by rendering 
congressional strengthening of that new law more difficult.”). 
 102. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3743 (incorporating by reference the 
explanation given on line 3133). 
 103. 481 U.S. 497 (1987). 
 104. See id. at 499. 
 105. See id.  
 106. See id. at 501. 
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harmless-error analysis (rather than invalidating the 
convictions outright).107 The authors counted this as a vote 
against a liberal speaker.108 Is that a fair characterization of 
Justice Scalia’s actions when he agreed with the attendants’ 
First Amendment claim but stopped short of giving them 
their most favorable remedy? Elsewhere in their study, the 
authors themselves provide reason to doubt it. When 
evaluating a different case (Dawson v. Delaware109), the 
authors counted Justice Scalia as voting in favor of a 
conservative speaker when he voted to accept the speaker’s 
First Amendment argument but also to remand for harmless-
error analysis.110 Needless to say, the conflict between those 
coding decisions cannot be resolved by supposing that a 
remand for harmless-error analysis is irrelevant when 
Justice Scalia otherwise supported a conservative speaker, 
but that the same remand negates a vote that would 
otherwise count as support for a liberal speaker. 
The authors again failed to fairly characterize Justice 
Scalia’s vote in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri.111 Charles 
Guarnieri, a unionized employee, alleged that his former 
municipal employer violated his constitutional rights by 
firing him in retaliation for asserting his legal rights in an 
earlier workplace dispute.112 He argued that, to prevail under 
the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, he did not need to 
prove that the matter for which he suffered retaliation was a 
matter of public concern.113 Justice Scalia filed a separate 
opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part, and the authors counted it as a vote against Guarnieri, 
  
 107. See id. at 500-04. 
 108. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3782. They have tried to defend their 
decision, again opaquely stating that they were “coding votes (not opinions), in 
accord with a set of established rules.” Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3133. 
 109. 503 U.S. 159 (1992); see also infra notes 188-96 and accompanying text 
(discussing the authors’ problematic handling of Dawson). 
 110. See Dawson, 503 U.S. at 168-69 (inviting the lower court to take up the 
harmless-error issue on remand); Codings, supra note 52, at line 3807. 
 111. 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011). 
 112. Id. at 2492. 
 113. See id. at 2491. 
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just as they counted the vote of the Court as a whole.114 Unlike 
the majority, however, Justice Scalia agreed with Guarnieri’s 
contention that, to bring a claim under the Petition Clause, 
he need not show that the matter for which he suffered 
retaliation was a matter of public concern.115 Moreover, 
although Justice Scalia concluded that Guarnieri could not 
cite his union grievance as a basis for a First Amendment 
retaliation claim,116 he nevertheless believed there were 
grounds on which Guarnieri should win. Because the parties 
had agreed (over Justice Scalia’s doubts) that lawsuits are 
“petitions” protected by the Petition Clause, Justice Scalia 
contended that Guarnieri should prevail on his claim alleging 
that he suffered retaliation for bringing a Section 1983 action 
against city officials.117 (That was the basis on which a portion 
of his opinion was labeled a dissent.) The authors thus erred 
when they simplistically coded Justice Scalia as voting 
against the speaker. The authors have since tried to justify 
their coding decision by again reiterating that they were 
“coding votes, not opinions.”118 Once again, however, that 
opaque explanation fails to take account of Justice Scalia’s 
vote to dissent from a portion of the majority’s anti-speaker 
judgment. 
One of the authors’ mistakes when coding Justice Scalia’s 
votes worked to his advantage in the study. In Rosenberger 
v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,119 a 
Christian student group challenged the University of 
Virginia’s denial of their request for funding.120 The authors 
coded the students as conservative but logged Justice Scalia 
  
 114. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3777. 
 115. See Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2504-06 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part). 
 116. Id. at 2506 (stating that the Petition Clause should not protect employees 
from retaliation for petitions that “are addressed to the government in its capacity 
as the petitioners’ employer” and that “[a] union grievance is the epitome” of such 
a petition).  
 117. Id. at 2506-07. 
 118. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 4490. 
 119. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 120. See id. at 822-27. 
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as voting against them.121 The latter was a mistake. Justice 
Scalia joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, ruling in 
the students’ favor.122 Once that error was pointed out to 
them, the authors corrected it.123 
C. Erroneous Classifications of Speakers’ Ideological 
Identities 
There are numerous cases in which there are good 
reasons to conclude that the authors incorrectly classified 
speakers’ ideological identities. As I have already explained, 
for example, the authors coded the speakers in Washington 
State Grange as conservative, thereby either disregarding 
the fact that the Washington State Republican Party—the 
speaker named in the case caption—was joined by the 
Washington State Democratic Central Committee and the 
Libertarian Party of Washington State; overestimating the 
likelihood that the justices themselves regarded the parties’ 
claims as ideologically conservative in nature; or making an 
undefended assumption that—in the eyes of a justice driven 
by in-group bias—the ideological quality of the speech always 
trumps the usual ideological identity of the speaker.124 
The same kinds of problems afflict the authors’ 
classification of New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez 
Torres125 as a case involving a liberal speaker.126 Margarita 
Lopez Torres had repeatedly tried and failed to secure the 
Democratic nomination for a seat on the Supreme Court of 
New York.127 She alleged that the state’s system of using 
political parties’ conventions to select Supreme Court justices 
violated her First Amendment right of association.128 A 
majority of the Court rejected that claim.129 If Lopez Torres’s 
  
 121. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3883. 
 122. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822, 845-46. 
 123. See Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3797. 
 124. See supra Part I.C. 
 125. 552 U.S. 196 (2008). 
 126. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3904. 
 127. See Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 201. 
 128. See id. at 203-04. 
 129. See id. at 203-07. 
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Democratic affiliation were all one knew about the case, one 
would indeed classify the case’s First Amendment claimant 
as liberal. Yet even then, the case would be problematic for 
purposes of the authors’ study because a loss for Lopez Torres 
would amount to a win for the state’s Democratic Party, and 
vice versa. It thus would be difficult for a justice to determine 
on which side of the “v” his or her ideological opponents or 
allies appeared. Would a bias-driven conservative rather vote 
against a Democratic judicial candidate or against the 
Democratic Party whose nomination the candidate sought? 
Just as in Washington State Grange, however, there were 
multiple parties involved in the case. Lopez Torres was one 
of nine plaintiff-respondents challenging the New York 
system, a group that included both Democratic and 
Republican candidates for judicial office and both Democratic 
and Republican voters who objected to the state’s manner of 
selecting Supreme Court justices.130 Correspondingly, 
beneath the “et al.” on the other side of the “v” were (among 
others) the New York Republican State Committee and the 
New York County Democratic Committee.131 Because the case 
concerned the jointly asserted First Amendment claims of 
Democrats and Republicans against their respective political 
parties, because there is no persuasive reason to assume that 
conservative and liberal justices made different in-group and 
out-group assessments of the plaintiffs’ challenge to the 
convention system, and because the authors provide no 
reason to believe that the ideological quality of speech always 
trumps the usual ideological identity of the speaker, the case 
probably should have been excluded from the study. It simply 
does not give us a reliable basis for assessing a justice’s 
susceptibility to in-group bias. 
The authors’ handling of California Democratic Party v. 
  
 130. See id. at 201 (noting that Lopez Torres was joined by other judicial 
candidates and voters); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4-9, 
Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 411 F. Supp. 2d 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(04-CV-1129), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/
documents/complaint_004.pdf (describing each of the parties to the lawsuit). 
 131. Cf. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 203 (“[B]oth the Republican and Democratic 
state parties have intervened from the very early stages of this litigation to defend 
New York’s electoral law.”). 
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Jones132 is even more objectionable. The issue in that case 
concerned political parties’ objection to California’s decision 
to allow non-party members to vote in parties’ primary 
elections.133 The authors classified the case’s First 
Amendment claimants as liberal,134 perhaps due to the 
identity of the speaker identified in the name of the case. As 
the fourth paragraph of the Court’s opinion explains, 
however, the Democrats were joined by the California 
Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of California, and 
the Peace and Freedom Party.135 
The authors have tried to explain their coding of the case, 
stating that “[a] challenge to the party establishment to offer 
more inclusion in the nomination process and on the ballots 
[is driven by] a liberal motivation regardless of which party 
is being challenged.”136 I have already questioned the 
accuracy of the authors’ assumption that conservative and 
liberal justices would indeed make differing in-group and 
out-group assessments of a case on those sorts of grounds.137 
But even if that were a sound basis for coding the expression 
in California Democratic Party, the authors have got things 
exactly backward. The First Amendment claimants were the 
political parties resisting non-party voting in primary 
elections. On the authors’ explanation of their coding 
decision, they should have coded the case as one featuring 
conservative expression, not liberal. 
The same problems recurred in Eu v. San Francisco 
County Democratic Central Committee.138 The Democrats in 
that case objected to various ways in which California law 
restricted their party activities, such as by banning official 
party endorsements in primary elections, limiting the tenure 
  
 132. 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
 133. See id. at 569-70. 
 134. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3071. 
 135. See Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 571. 
 136. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3985 (incorporating by reference the 
explanation provided on line 4359). 
 137. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text (discussing Washington State 
Grange). 
 138. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).  
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of party chairs, and requiring geographic rotation of party 
chairholders.139 The authors coded the First Amendment 
claimants as liberal,140 perhaps in part because the San 
Francisco Democrats were named in the case caption. Once 
again, however, political parties from across the ideological 
spectrum joined together to advance the same set of 
constitutional arguments. As Justice Marshall explained 
early in his opinion for the Court, the suit was brought by 
“[v]arious county central committees of the Democratic and 
Republican Parties, the state central committee of the 
Libertarian Party, members of various state and county 
central committees, and other groups and individuals active 
in partisan politics.”141 How would an opportunistic, bias-
driven justice know where to turn? 
In an attempt to justify their coding decision, the authors 
have reiterated their view that “[a] challenge to the party 
establishment to offer more inclusion in the nomination 
process and on the ballots” is ideologically liberal in nature.142 
Unfortunately, the authors are again confused about the 
facts. The First Amendment claimants in Eu were the 
political parties themselves, not those challenging the 
parties’ preferred ways of doing business. On the authors’ 
explanation, they should have coded the case as one involving 
conservative expression. The mismatch between coding 
decisions and explanations lends strength to the worry that, 
at the time the coding decisions were being made in the first 
instance, case captions played an outsized role. 
The case caption evidently once again caused problems 
for the authors when coding Rutan v. Republican Party of 
Illinois.143 The authors determined that the First 
Amendment claimants in that case were conservative.144 
Those claimants were individuals who alleged that the 
  
 139. See id. at 216-19. 
 140. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1065. 
 141. Eu, 489 U.S. at 219. 
 142. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3305 (incorporating by reference the 
explanation provided on line 4359). 
 143. 497 U.S. 62 (1990). 
 144. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1106. 
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Republican Governor of Illinois denied them jobs, 
promotions, or transfers because they were not supporters of 
the Republican Party and because they lacked the support of 
local Republican officials.145 There is no reason to suppose 
that conservative justices would regard those individuals as 
desirable beneficiaries of preferential voting. 
A narrow focus on the First Amendment claimant named 
in the caption also appears to have led the authors into 
trouble when evaluating United States v. National Treasury 
Employees Union.146 That case concerned a federal law 
barring nearly all federal employees from receiving 
honoraria for their speaking and writing engagements.147 The 
law’s primary purpose was to avoid the ethical problems that 
could arise when federal employees received honoraria for 
speaking or writing about matters relating to their 
employment.148 The ban, however, extended even to speeches 
and writings dealing with non-work matters.149 The National 
Treasury Employees Union—one of several plaintiffs who 
filed lawsuits challenging the restriction—was named to 
represent the class of all Executive Branch employees below 
the GS-16 level who would receive honoraria but for the 
federal restriction.150 One of the plaintiffs, for example, was 
an attorney for the Department of Labor who lectured on 
Judaism; another was a Postal Service employee who 
lectured on the Quaker religion; another was an attorney for 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who wrote on Russian 
history; another was a microbiologist who reviewed dance 
performances; another was a tax examiner who wrote about 
environmental matters and earthquakes; another was an 
aerospace engineer who lectured on African-American 
  
 145. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 66-67. 
 146. 513 U.S. 454 (1995). 
 147. See id. at 457-60 (identifying the relevant statutes and administrative 
regulations). 
 148. See id.  
 149. See id. at 457. 
 150. Id. at 461. 
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history.151 
The authors concluded that the case featured a liberal 
speaker simply because (they have since explained) one of the 
many First Amendment claimants was a union.152 Yet the 
dispute had absolutely nothing to do with labor law or with 
the powers of unions. Rather, the union represented a class 
composed of all lower-ranking Executive Branch employees 
who wished to speak and write in exchange for payment but 
were barred by federal law from doing so. There is no reliable 
basis for presuming that the justices saw all—or even most—
of those employees as coming from one ideological enclave 
rather than the other. There certainly is no reason to think 
that intelligent justices would regard the entire set of First 
Amendment claims in an ideologically liberal light merely by 
virtue of the fact that one of the scores of plaintiffs was a 
union. 
Just as the authors too quickly assumed that a case with 
a union in the title involved liberal speech, they too quickly 
assumed that Board of Regents v. Southworth153 involved 
liberal speech because the speakers were college students. In 
Southworth, a handful of students enrolled at the University 
of Wisconsin raised a First Amendment objection to the 
university’s use of mandatory student fees to support student 
organizations and activities to which those students objected 
on political or ideological grounds.154 The authors coded those 
speakers as liberal,155 evidently on the assumption that 
college students tend toward the ideological left. Here, 
however, at least some of the students were decidedly 
conservative. Among the student groups to which they 
  
 151. See id. at 461-62 (providing some of these examples); Brief for Respondents, 
National Treasury Employees Union, et al. at 7-8, United States v. Nat’l Treasury 
Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (No. 93-1170) (providing some of these 
examples). 
 152. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3183 (coding the case); Appendix C, 
supra note 57, at line 3751 (“While the individual speakers may have different 
beliefs, this is also a union dispute and the [Supreme Court] Database codes the 
pro-union position as liberal (unless it is a union member against the union.”). 
 153. 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
 154. Id. at 226-27. 
 155. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3242. 
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objected were Amnesty International; the Campus Women’s 
Center; the Internationalist Socialist Organization; the 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Campus Center; the Madison AIDS 
Support Network; the student chapter of the National 
Organization for Women; the Progressive Student Network; 
the Student Labor Action Coalition; and the UW Greens.156 
That presumably is one of the reasons why conservative 
organizations like the Christian Legal Society and the 
Washington Legal Foundation lined up as amici curiae in 
support of the students,157 while the liberal Brennan Center 
for Justice and the Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund were among those who filed briefs in support of the 
university.158 
There was only one speaker in Arkansas Educational 
Television Commission v. Forbes,159 and so here one 
encounters difficulties of a different sort. The issue in Forbes 
was whether a public television station violated the First 
Amendment rights of an independent candidate named 
Ralph Forbes when it refused to allow him to join a televised 
debate among candidates for a congressional seat.160 The 
study’s authors counted him as a liberal speaker161 because 
  
 156. See Brief for Respondents at 3-12, Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 
217 (2000) (No. 98-1189). 
 157. See Brief of Christian Legal Society as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (No. 98-1189); 
Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation and the Committee for a Constructive 
Tomorrow as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Bd. of Regents v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (No. 98-1189); see generally LEE EPSTEIN, 
CONSERVATIVES IN COURT 172 (1985) (explaining that the Washington Legal 
Foundation was established “to defend the free enterprise system and to counter 
the liberal public interest law movement”). 
 158. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Brennan Center for Justice at New York 
University School of Law in Support of Petitioners, Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 
529 U.S. 217 (2000) (No. 98-1189); Brief of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender Campus Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) 
(No. 98-1189). 
 159. 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
 160. Id. at 669-71. 
 161. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3092. 
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(the authors have since explained) he was advocating 
“greater inclusion in the political process.”162 To judge the 
likelihood that this was indeed the factor that determined the 
justices’ in-group and out-group assessments of the 
ideological enclave from which Forbes’s First Amendment 
claim came, one might want to take a closer look at Forbes 
himself. In a 1990 story, the New York Times reported that 
Forbes was then seeking the Republican nomination to 
become Arkansas’s lieutenant governor, that Forbes was “a 
neo-Nazi white supremacist,” that he had “managed the 
[1988] Presidential campaign of David Duke,” that he 
declared himself to be “100 percent right-to-life” and believed 
that Republicans who were soft on abortion were “wimps” 
and “beady-eyed scuzzballs,” that he “advocate[d] sending 
American blacks to a black homeland in Africa,” and that he 
was “a fervent advocate of capital punishment.”163 That 
alleged history was not forgotten when Forbes’s case arrived 
at the Court. When covering the parties’ oral arguments, for 
example, the Washington Post reported that Forbes was “a 
former member of the American Nazi Party.”164 One simply 
cannot be confident that a bias-driven liberal justice would 
have seen Forbes’s case as an opportunity to secure a victory 
for the liberal team. 
One finds similar trouble (albeit on less inflammatory 
grounds) in Burdick v. Takushi.165 Alan Burdick, a resident of 
Hawaii, alleged that the state violated his First Amendment 
rights of speech and association by refusing to count write-in 
votes that he wished to cast in primary and general 
elections.166 The authors coded him as a liberal speaker on the 
rationale that Burdick was trying to open up the political 
  
 162. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3913. 
 163. Voters Face Racial Choice in Arkansas Runoff, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1990, 
at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/12/us/voters-face-racial-
choice-in-arkansas-runoff.html.  
 164. Joan Biskupic, Justices Question Barring Fringe Candidates from Debates 
on Public TV, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1997, at A15, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/supcourt/stories/ark_100997.htm. 
 165. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 166. Id. at 430. 
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process.167 There are good reasons to believe, however, that 
Burdick himself identified with the conservative end of the 
spectrum, and that the justices themselves knew this claim 
was brought in an effort to weaken the Democratic Party’s 
grip in Hawaii. The state explained in its brief that Burdick’s 
dissatisfaction had blossomed when only one candidate 
appeared on the Republican primary ballot to fill a seat in 
the state legislature.168 Burdick was dissatisfied with that 
candidate and wished to vote—in the Republican primary—
for someone else.169 Moreover, as Justice Kennedy explained 
in his dissent, Hawaii’s opposition to write-in votes helped 
maintain the Democratic Party’s political control in the 
state.170 Indeed, as the case was winding its way to the Court, 
the New York Times reported that one of the reasons Burdick 
opposed Hawaii’s restriction was that “the ban on write-in 
votes helps keep Hawaii politics a virtual Democratic 
monopoly.”171 On what basis can we be confident that liberal 
justices would regard Burdick as an ideological teammate 
and that conservative justices would regard him as an 
ideological enemy? 
The same problem arises again in Board of County 
Commissioners v. Umbehr.172 Keen Umbehr—a trash-hauler 
in Kansas—sued county officials after they terminated his 
contract with the county.173 Umbehr alleged that the officials 
were retaliating against him for speech they found 
objectionable. Umbehr had long been a thorn in county 
officials’ side, frequently writing and speaking about matters 
concerning landfill user rates, county officials’ alleged 
violations of the state’s open-meetings law, the cost and 
  
 167. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1914; Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 
3590 (incorporating by reference the explanation given on line 3913). 
 168. See Respondent’s Brief at 15-16, Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) 
(No. 91-535). 
 169. See id.  
 170. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 171. Robert Reinhold, Hawaii Lawsuit May Test Limits of Write-In Votes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1991, at B12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/29/us/
hawaii-lawsuit-may-test-limits-of-write-in-votes.html.  
 172. 518 U.S. 668 (1996). 
 173. Id. at 671-72. 
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difficulty of obtaining public records from the county, the 
county’s use of taxpayer money, and the like.174 The authors 
concluded he was a liberal speaker.175 Yet the matters about 
which Umbehr had spoken or sought transparency were not 
slanted in one ideological direction or the other—if anything, 
his speech likely tended toward the conservative to the extent 
he was complaining about government fees and uses of 
taxpayer money. Neither the opinion, the parties’ briefs, nor 
the court of appeals’ ruling below provides a reliable basis for 
assuming that Umbehr was allied with the liberal ideological 
team. If one digs deeper into Umbehr’s biography, one learns 
that, throughout the time of this lawsuit and beyond, he 
identified as a Republican and was active in Republican 
politics, even once running as a Republican for county 
office.176 (At the time of this writing, Umbehr is running as 
the Libertarian candidate for the Kansas governorship.177). 
Umbehr was certainly not a liberal and neither was his 
speech, and there is nothing on the face of the record that 
would have caused the justices to believe otherwise. 
One again finds Republicans—this time on both sides of 
  
 174. See id. at 671. 
 175. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3137. 
 176. Telephone Interview with Keen Umbehr (May 28, 2014). Of course, the 
justices might not have known about Umbehr’s Republican activism—but even if 
they didn’t, they still had no clear reason to believe he was liberal. Setting that 
important fact aside, the case raises a question: when trying to sniff out evidence 
of in-group bias, how much knowledge should we presume the justices possess 
about the players in local party politics? Consider, for example, Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992). In that case, a local party activist was working on 
a city council candidate’s political campaign in Tennessee. She objected on First 
Amendment grounds to a state law that restricted electioneering activities near 
the entrances to polling places. See id. at 193-94. The authors regarded the 
activist as a liberal speaker. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3845. The fact 
that a person wishes to solicit votes or distribute campaign literature near the 
entrance to a polling place tells one nothing about that person’s conservative or 
liberal tilt. As far as I can tell, the parties’ briefs do not identify the political 
affiliation of the party activist or of the political candidate on whose campaign 
she was then working. Friends in Tennessee tell me they suspect the activist was 
a Democrat. When can we safely assume that the justices themselves know (or 
take steps to learn) the ideological affiliations of participants in local politics, 
when the briefs do not make those affiliations clear? 
 177. See Libertarian Umbehr Files for Kansas Governor, NEWTON KANSAN, May 
21, 2014, at 6. 
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the “v”—in Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia.178 In that 
case, three individuals objected to the Republican Party of 
Virginia’s requirement that they (like all other would-be 
delegates) pay a fee to participate in a convention being held 
to select the party’s nominee for United States Senator.179 The 
individuals were two Republicans who had long been active 
in Republican politics, plus one independent.180 The authors 
coded those three First Amendment claimants as liberal.181 
All three individuals wished to participate in the Republican 
convention, and there is nothing in the Court’s opinion that 
would lead one to believe they were liberals trying to crash 
the Republicans’ party. If the fact that the plaintiffs were 
trying to open up the Republicans’ political process is the 
reason we are to assume that the justices saw those plaintiffs 
in an ideologically liberal light,182 then we are being asked to 
stretch a very long way indeed. 
San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic 
Committee183 takes us far from the realm of intra-party 
disputes among Republicans. The organizers of the Gay 
Olympic Games slated to be held in San Francisco in 1982 
raised a First Amendment objection to federal legislation 
granting exclusive use of the word “Olympic” to the United 
States Olympic Committee.184 The authors coded the Gay 
Olympics’ organizers as conservative,185 notwithstanding the 
conflict with one of the few coding criteria that the authors 
expressly described for their readers—namely, that speech 
  
 178. 517 U.S. 186 (1996). 
 179. See id. at 190-91. 
 180. See Brief for Appellants at 6, Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 
186 (1996) (No. 94-203). 
 181. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3243. The case primarily concerned the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, but the parties on both sides did infuse their statutory 
arguments with First Amendment content. 
 182. That is the explanation that the authors have offered. See Appendix C, 
supra note 57, at line 3814 (incorporating by reference the explanation given on 
line 3913). 
 183. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 184. See id. at 525-30, 535-41. 
 185. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1206. Those organizers—not the 
USOC—were indeed the First Amendment claimants. 
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was deemed conservative if it was “anti-gay.”186 
D. Questionable Classifications of Speakers’ Ideological 
Identities 
There are many cases in which, even if not plainly wrong, 
the authors’ classifications of speakers’ ideological identities 
can readily be questioned, leaving one far from certain that 
those classifications correspond to the ideological identities 
that the justices themselves perceived. Of course, being 
reasonably certain that one has captured how the justices 
perceived the speakers is critical to the task that Professors 
Epstein, Parker, and Segal set for themselves. If one cannot 
be reasonably sure whether a justice perceived a given 
speaker as a member of an ideological in-group or out-group, 
one cannot confidently use the justice’s treatment of that 
speaker to measure the justice’s tendency toward ideological 
in-group bias. It is the perception that a person belongs to an 
in-group or out-group, after all, that triggers the temptation 
of bias.187 As the following cases collectively illustrate, 
identifying in binary fashion the ideological team to which a 
speaker belongs can be a remarkably fuzzy business. My 
purpose here is thus not to say how the speakers’ ideologies 
should have been coded; to the contrary, it is to highlight the 
uncertainties that surround any effort to capture the justices’ 
own perceptions of ideologically nuanced cases. 
Consider, first, the authors’ startling treatment of 
Dawson v. Delaware.188 David Dawson, a convicted murderer 
sitting on Delaware’s death row, alleged that the state had 
violated his First Amendment rights during his sentencing 
proceedings by allowing the prosecutor to tell the jury that 
Dawson had the words “Aryan Brotherhood” tattooed on his 
hand, that the Aryan Brotherhood was “a white racist prison 
gang,” and that Dawson called himself “Abaddon,” by which 
  
 186. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (emphasis added). 
 187. See Tajfel & Turner, supra note 25, at 40 (explaining that the groundwork 
for in-group bias is laid when, among other things, there is “a collection of 
individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category”) 
(emphasis added). 
 188. 503 U.S. 159 (1992). 
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he meant he was a disciple of Satan.189 Eight justices 
concluded that Dawson’s First Amendment right to free 
association had indeed been violated, then remanded for 
harmless-error analysis.190 The authors counted those as 
votes in favor of a conservative speaker.191 Calling himself one 
of Satan’s disciples certainly did not land Dawson in the 
conservative camp. Is the assumption here that a speaker’s 
self-identification as a racist will, standing alone, signal to 
the conservative justices that he “conforms to [those justices’ 
own] values”?192 
In earlier versions of their paper, the authors revealed 
that something along those lines was in fact their rationale, 
stating that they coded “racist communication” and “racist 
behavior” as conservative expression.193 There are additional 
cases—a pair involving cross-burnings, for example—in 
which the authors appear to have proceeded on the 
assumption that conservative justices do indeed see racists 
as members of their own ideological in-group.194 The authors 
evidently regarded racism as a hallmark of conservative 
justices’ in-group no matter what the race of the individual 
who was behaving or speaking in a racist fashion. In one case, 
  
 189. Id. at 161-63. 
 190. See id. at 165-69. 
 191. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1927. 
 192. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 3. 
 193. Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jeffrey A. Segal, Do Justices Defend 
the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First Amendment 8 
(Aug. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Epstein et al., 2013 Version] (on file with author), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2300572 (“racist 
communication”); Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jeffrey Segal, Do 
Justices Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First 
Amendment 7 (Aug. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Epstein et al., 2012 Version] (on file 
with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2107425 (“racist behavior”). In the examples of conservative expression that 
the authors provide in the most recent version of their paper, racists have been 
replaced by pro-life speakers. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 10. 
 194. See, e.g., Codings, supra note 52, at line 1813 (coding as conservative the 
teenager in R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), who allegedly burned 
a cross in the yard of an African-American family); id. at line 3072 (coding as 
conservative the individuals in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), who burned 
crosses at a Ku Klux Klan rally and in the yard of an African-American man). 
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for example—a case they foregrounded in earlier versions of 
their paper—they coded as conservative an African-
American man whose sentence for aggravated battery had 
been enhanced because he selected his victim (a young white 
boy) on the basis of his race.195 The authors’ apparent belief 
about what qualifies a person for in-group-member status in 
the eyes of conservative justices is extraordinary. It is equally 
extraordinary to suppose that, in Dawson, the speaker’s 
racist self-identification would trump the fact that he was a 
convicted murderer seeking invalidation of his capital 
sentence—hardly the kind of litigant one imagines would 
ordinarily draw a conservative justice’s bias-driven vote.196 
We move to quite different territory in Los Angeles Police 
Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp.,197 where 
the dispute concerned a particular kind of commercial 
speech. United Reporting was a privately owned business 
that gathered the names and addresses of recently arrested 
individuals and then sold that information to insurers, 
driving schools, drug and alcohol counselors, and lawyers.198 
A state statute required United Reporting and others 
requesting arrested individuals’ addresses to declare that 
they would not use the information for marketing purposes.199 
The authors regarded United Reporting as a liberal 
speaker.200 In other commercial-speech cases, however, the 
study’s authors often classified the speakers as conservative 
(a decision that some might question on a case-by-case basis). 
Even more to the point, in another commercial-speech case 
  
 195. See id. at line 1881 (coding Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)); 
Epstein et al., 2013 Version, supra note 193, at 8 & n.23 (citing Mitchell); Epstein 
et al., 2012 Version, supra note 193, at 7 (citing Mitchell). 
 196. In many other cases, the authors classified prisoners as liberal. See, e.g., 
Codings, supra note 52, at line 3922 (coding as liberal the prisoner in Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), who challenged a prison restriction on inmate 
correspondence); id. at line 3837 (coding as liberal the prisoner in Shaw v. 
Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001), who wished to assist other inmates with legal 
matters). 
 197. 528 U.S. 32 (1999). 
 198. Id. at 34. 
 199. Id. at 34-35. 
 200. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3211. 
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(Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.), the study’s authors were faced 
with “data miners” in the business of gathering prescriber-
identifying information from pharmacies and then selling 
that information to pharmaceutical companies for use in 
those companies’ marketing efforts.201 The authors coded 
those data miners as conservative.202 Assuming that was a 
fair classification, why not similarly code United Reporting 
as a conservative data miner engaged in both producing and 
facilitating commercial speech? 203 
Some of the debatably classified cases involve the press. 
In Florida Star v. B.J.F., for example, the Florida Star—a 
weekly newspaper in Jacksonville, Florida—had violated a 
state law by publishing the full name of a woman who had 
been sexually assaulted.204 A jury awarded her damages,205 
but a majority of the Court ruled that imposing liability on 
the newspaper violated its First Amendment rights.206 The 
authors coded the newspaper’s speech as conservative 
because, in their view, keeping the identity of a survivor of 
sexual assault private “is more of a liberal interest.”207 There 
are good reasons to be skeptical about that decision. Do we 
really think the Court’s conservatives perceive speech as 
coming from one of their own when—indeed, because—that 
speech is insensitive to a woman who has been sexually 
assaulted? Moreover, the Florida Star is part of a media 
industry that is widely perceived as tending toward the left 
as a general matter, and the authors sometimes coded other 
  
 201. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2660 (2011). 
 202. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3882. 
 203. The authors have subsequently said they coded the case as they did 
because some of the information was supplied “to groups that could provide 
support to arrested individuals.” Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3949. But 
couldn’t one just as easily say that some of the information was provided to profit-
seeking insurance companies and driving schools to increase their revenues? If 
so, shouldn’t one confess that one really has no idea how the individual justices 
themselves perceived the ideological tenor of the First Amendment claim? 
 204. 491 U.S. 524, 526-28 (1989). 
 205. Id. at 529. 
 206. Id. at 541. 
 207. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3349; see also Codings, supra note 52, at 
line 1060. 
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members of that industry accordingly.208 A number of media 
organizations lined up behind the newspaper as amici curiae 
(including, for example, the New York Times Company and 
the American Newspaper Publishers Association),209 while 
the conservative Pacific Legal Foundation filed an amicus 
brief in support of the woman.210 The Florida Star, moreover, 
is no ordinary newspaper. It was founded in 1951 by an 
African-American journalist;211 it bills itself as “Northeast 
Florida’s oldest African American-owned newspaper” and as 
“committed to providing [readers] with the latest and most 
accurate news possible that affects the African American 
Community;”212 and it claims that “[m]ore African-Americans 
turn to The Florida Star for their source of Black news than 
any other media in North Central Florida and South 
Georgia.”213 All things considered, can one really assume that 
the justices saw the newspaper’s First Amendment claim as 
emanating from a conservative enclave? 
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.214 takes us from 
newspapers to radio. Here, the speaker was a radio station 
  
 208. See, e.g., Lars Willnat & David H. Weaver, The American Journalist in the 
Digital Age: Key Findings 11, IND. UNIV. BLOOMINGTON NEWSROOM, available at 
http://news.indiana.edu/releases/iu/2014/05/2013-american-journalist-key-findin
gs.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (reporting that American journalists are far 
more likely to identify themselves as Independents or Democrats than 
Republicans); Codings, supra note 52, at line 3772 (coding as liberal the 
newspaper in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), which had 
published an allegedly defamatory story about a high-school wrestling coach).  
 209. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Newspaper Publishers Association, the 
New York Times Company, the Miami Herald Publishing Company, the Tribune 
Company, the Times Herald Printing Company, McClatchey Newspapers, Inc., 
and the Florida First Amendment Foundation, Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 
(1989) (No. 87-329). 
 210. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Pacific Legal Foundation, in Support of 
Appellee, Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (No. 87-329); see generally 
EPSTEIN, supra note 157, at 171 (stating that the Pacific Legal Foundation was 
“the first conservative public interest legal foundation”). 
 211. See About, FLA. STAR, http://www.thefloridastar.com/about-2 (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2014). 
 212. Id.  
 213. Subscribe, FLA. STAR, http://www.thefloridastar.com/subscribe (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2014). 
 214. 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
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based in North Carolina that wished to air advertisements 
for the Virginia lottery.215 North Carolina itself did not permit 
lotteries, and a federal statute thus barred the station from 
running the ads.216 The authors regarded the station as a 
liberal speaker.217 In other cases, however, the authors 
regarded speakers as conservative when they were radio and 
television stations wishing to run advertisements for 
casinos,218 liquor stores wishing to advertise their prices,219 
and cigarette manufacturers and retailers wishing to 
advertise their products.220 Assuming for the sake of 
argument that the authors properly classified the radio and 
television stations that wished to advertise casinos, as well 
as the entities that wished to advertise liquor prices and 
cigarettes (decisions with which one might disagree—after 
all, don’t some social conservatives frown upon gambling, 
drinking, and smoking?), why should we categorize as liberal 
the radio station that wanted to advertise the Virginia 
lottery? From my vantage point—but not from the study’s 
authors’221—it is far from clear that there is a dispositive 
difference between state-run lotteries and privately owned 
casinos in the eyes of conservative and liberal justices who 
are making in-group and out-group assessments of speakers’ 
ideological identities. 
Recall that, in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,222 a 
unionized employee alleged that his employer had 
unconstitutionally discriminated against him.223 The authors 
  
 215. See id. at 423-24. 
 216. See id. at 422-23. 
 217. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1825. 
 218. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 
(1999); Codings, supra note 52, at line 3764. 
 219. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Codings, 
supra note 52, at line 3774. 
 220. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Codings, supra 
note 52, at line 3776. 
 221. See Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3679. 
 222. 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011). 
 223. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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determined that the employee was a liberal speaker.224 If 
Guarnieri’s union-member status were the only known fact 
about him, one likely would accept the authors’ classification. 
This particular speaker, however, was the town’s chief of 
police.225 Coming to his defense as amici curiae were the 
National Fraternal Order of Police, the National Troopers 
Coalition, and the Pennsylvania State Troopers Association, 
who argued (among other things) that “[b]ecause of the 
higher standard to which police officers are held and the 
resulting political and media pressure which comes to bear, 
police officers are uniquely vulnerable to politically 
motivated, arbitrary and retaliatory employment action.”226 
With police officers and their interests so squarely in the 
picture, can one confidently say that a conservative justice 
would see Guarnieri as a member of the opposing ideological 
team? In their discussion of a different case—Garcetti v. 
Ceballos227—Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal write that 
in-group biases may have prompted conservative justices to 
be hostile to the claims of a speaker who “was a whistle 
blower (and one who blew his whistle on a law enforcement 
officer no less!).”228 That emphatic reference to the fact that 
someone took actions adverse to a law-enforcement officer 
suggests that a conservative justice might look on Chief of 
Police Guarnieri with ideological affection. What reason do 
we have to believe that, for the justices, law enforcement 
officers switch ideological teams when they join a union or 
sue their employers for retaliation?  
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association is also 
questionably classified.229 Under the governorship of Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, California adopted legislation making it 
  
 224. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4455. 
 225. See Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2492. 
 226. Brief of Amici Curiae the National Fraternal Order of Police, the National 
Troopers Coalition & the Pennsylvania State Troopers Association in Support of 
Respondent at 7, Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011) (No. 09-
1476).  
 227. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 228. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 7. 
 229. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
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illegal to rent or sell “violent video games” to minors.230 The 
legislation defined such games as those 
“in which the range of options available to a player includes killing, 
maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a 
human being, if those acts are depicted” in a manner that “[a] 
reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find 
appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors,” that is “patently 
offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is 
suitable for minors,” and that “causes the game, as a whole, to lack 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.”231  
The statute’s drafters plainly tracked the famous language 
that—over the dissents of liberal justices—Chief Justice 
Burger and a majority of the Court had used when defining 
constitutionally unprotected obscenity in Miller v. 
California.232 The Entertainment Merchants Association and 
the Entertainment Software Association (makers and sellers 
of video games) argued that the statute violated their First 
Amendment rights.233 Governor Schwarzenegger and 
  
 230. Id. at 2732 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746-1746.5 (West 2014)). 
 231. Id. at 2732-33 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1)(A) (West 2014)). 
 232. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (“The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: 
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) 
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken 
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”) (internal 
quotation and citations omitted). 
 233. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2733. The ESA represents 
businesses both huge and small. See ESA Members, ESA, http:/www.theesa.com/
about/members.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). As profit-seeking companies, one 
might think of many of them as conservative. As entities pushing entertainment 
to minors with content that might conflict with the values of those children’s 
parents, one might think of many of them as liberal. According to one analysis, 
the ESA in the late 2000s divided its campaign contributions almost evenly 
between Republicans and Democrats. See Jennifer M. Profitt & Margaret A. 
Susca, Follow the Money: The Entertainment Software Association Attack on 
Video Game Regulation 18, available at http://www.academia.edu/2021684/
Follow_the_Money_The_Entertainment_Software_Association_Attack_on_Video
_Game_Regulation (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). As for the EMA, it supports 
policies one might associate both with the left (resisting “restrictions on adult 
content” and allowing the sale and rental of “lawfully made copies without 
restraint”) and the right (supporting “laws against video piracy”). See EMA’s 
Public Policy Priorities, ENTMERCH, http://www.entmerch.org/government-
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Attorney General Jerry Brown filed the brief on the merits 
defending the law,234 and then the case acquired Brown’s 
name after he became California’s next governor. Justice 
Scalia wrote for a majority of the Court, striking down the 
California law on First Amendment grounds.235 Justice Alito 
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, and Chief 
Justice Roberts joined it.236 The authors coded those as votes 
for conservative speakers.237 
Bearing in mind that the justices’ own perceptions are 
what matter in a study of in-group bias, how does that 
classification fare? California’s lawmakers had closely 
tracked the definition of obscenity that a conservative justice 
provided (and liberal justices resisted) in Miller, and the 
study’s authors classified those who produced obscene speech 
as liberal.238 In debates about the content of television shows, 
movies, and other forms of entertainment media, 
conservatives commonly make the case for decency and 
restraint, while liberals commonly make the case for free 
expression.239 When it comes to seeking removal of 
controversial content from the children’s section of libraries, 
conservatives have hardly been passive.240 It may be true that 
  
relations/public-policy-priorities.html#.U-TcJqAo6M8 (last visited Nov. 17, 
2014). 
 234. Petitioners’ Brief, Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) 
(No. 08-1448). 
 235. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2742 (“Legislation such as 
this . . . cannot survive strict scrutiny.”). 
 236. Id. (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I . . . agree with the Court that 
this particular law cannot be sustained. I disagree, however, with the approach 
taken in the Court’s opinion.”). 
 237. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4465 (Roberts); id. at line 4497 (Alito). 
 238. See, e.g., id. at line 372 (coding Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)). 
 239. The memorable activism of Tipper Gore, a prominent Democrat, against 
violent and sexually explicit lyrics stands as a reminder that one cannot make 
universally applicable generalizations about liberals’ and conservatives’ wishes 
and behavior. See Tipper Gore Widens War on Rock, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1988, at 
C18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/04/arts/tipper-gore-widens-
war-on-rock.html. Or perhaps it is a mistake to think that people ordinarily can 
be classified in a binary fashion in the first place. 
 240. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 856-58 (1982) (describing a 
school board’s efforts to remove controversial books from school libraries following 
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conservatives sometimes are more tolerant of violent 
entertainment and that liberals sometimes are more tolerant 
of sexual entertainment.241 But such a neat line is difficult to 
draw here; indeed, there are signs that this is not the line 
along which conservatives and liberals divided in this 
particular instance. The conservative Eagle Forum 
Education and Legal Defense Fund was among those who 
filed an amicus brief in support of the restrictive California 
law,242 for example, while the National Coalition Against 
Censorship, which formed in response to the Court’s 1973 
anti-obscenity ruling in Miller,243 was among the many free-
speech-favoring organizations that filed an amicus brief 
against it.244 Perhaps the speakers and speech in 
Entertainment Merchants Association are too ideologically 
indeterminate to classify. If pressed to place them in one 
camp or the other, however, I suspect many would join me in 
designating them as tending toward the left. 
A different sort of question clouds the authors’ handling 
of Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association.245 The authors 
usually classified employees who resisted unions as 
conservative,246 but they decided to classify the union-
  
a meeting with “a politically conservative organization of parents”); see generally 
Robert P. Doyle, Books Challenged or Banned in 2010-2011, available at 
http://www.ila.org/BannedBooks/BBW_Short_List_2010-2011_Single_R5.pdf 
(listing some of the library books to which objections were raised between May 
2010 and May 2011, the time period in which Entertainment Merchants 
Association was before the Court). 
 241. That is the basis on which the authors have tried to justify their coding of 
the case. See Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 4503. 
 242. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund 
in Support of Petitioners, Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) 
(No. 08-1448). 
 243. See About Us, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST CENSORSHIP, http://ncac.org/about-us 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2014). 
 244. See Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, the National 
Coalition Against Censorship and the National Youth Rights Association for the 
Respondents at 5-8. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (No. 
08-1448). 
 245. 500 U.S. 507 (1991). 
 246. See, e.g., Codings, supra note 52, at line 3384 (classifying as conservative 
the dissenting employees in Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 (2009)). 
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resisting employees in Lehnert as liberal.247 The authors have 
since explained that they coded the case as they did because 
this was (they believed) a case of “union members vs. union 
leadership.”248 Unfortunately, the authors are confused about 
the facts. The employees were not union members—rather, 
they were dissenting employees who contributed to the union 
only because they were required to do so by force of law.249 
And even if the authors had accurately applied their own 
coding criteria, one could still ask whether it was the 
employees’ status as faculty members (sometimes seen as 
tending toward the ideological left) or their status as union 
resisters that predominated in the eyes of the justices. 
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC250 shifts our 
attention from a state college to the Ivy League. Rosalie 
Tung—an associate professor at the University of 
Pennsylvania—filed a complaint against the school, alleging 
that it discriminated against her on the basis of her race, sex, 
and national origin when it denied her application for 
tenure.251 Citing First Amendment principles of academic 
freedom, the university refused to give the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission the unredacted 
tenure files of the plaintiff and of five male faculty members 
whom the plaintiff said had received more favorable 
treatment.252 The justices unanimously rejected the 
university’s argument, and the authors tallied those as votes 
against a liberal speaker.253 In many settings, universities 
and claims of academic freedom surely do have liberal 
overtones. But that line of thinking is plainly problematic 
here, where the university’s First Amendment claim centered 
on the fact that the university was resisting the EEOC’s 
  
 247. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1849. 
 248. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3520. 
 249. See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 511-13; see also Brief for the Petitioners at 3, 
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) (No. 89-1217) (“Petitioners 
(‘the nonmembers’) are . . . not union members . . . .”). 
 250. 493 U.S. 182 (1990). 
 251. Id. at 185. 
 252. Id. at 185-86. 
 253. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1107. 
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effort to investigate a minority female’s allegations of 
employment discrimination.254 
The Court’s ruling in City of Dallas v. Stanglin255 
concerned a dance hall catering to older children. Responding 
to demand for dance venues where children could safely go, 
the City of Dallas had adopted an ordinance under which 
business owners could obtain a license to run a dance hall to 
which only children between the ages of fourteen and 
eighteen could be admitted (making exceptions for parents, 
guardians, dance-hall employees, and law enforcement 
personnel).256 Charles Stanglin, the owner of the Twilight 
Skating Rink, obtained one of the licenses and then divided 
his skating rink in half, with one side devoted to skating and 
the other devoted to dancing by children within the 
designated ages.257 Stanglin then challenged the ordinance’s 
age restriction, arguing that it violated the First Amendment 
associational rights of children who wished to spend time 
with individuals outside the designated age range.258 For all 
nine justices, the focus was on the children, not on Stanglin 
(who did not assert a First Amendment claim of his own).259 
Specifically, the justices focused on the claim that teenagers 
congregating at a dance hall are engaged in an associational 
activity protected by the Constitution.260 The authors 
regarded the speakers as liberal.261 Yet it is not apparent why 
a liberal justice would personally regard those teenagers as 
ideological allies by virtue of the teenagers’ desire to spend 
  
 254. See Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 188. For a discussion of the authors’ 
problematic handling of instances in which a speaker ordinarily associated with 
one ideological camp produces speech that is ordinarily associated with the other, 
see infra Part II.E. 
 255. 490 U.S. 19 (1989). 
 256. See id. at 21-22. 
 257. Id. at 22. 
 258. Id.  
 259. See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 
(1989) (No. 87-1848). 
 260. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24-25; id. at 28 (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment). The Court also evaluated the case under the Equal Protection Clause 
because it involved an age-based classification. Id. at 25-28 (majority opinion). 
 261. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1277. 
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time with people over the age of eighteen, nor is it apparent 
why a conservative justice would regard those teenagers as 
members of the “opposing ideological team.”262 
The authors coded personal-injury and foreclosure 
attorneys who wished to send direct-mail solicitations to 
potential clients as liberal,263 while coding a Certified Public 
Accountant who wished to do the same thing as 
conservative.264 (By the way, one cannot easily reconcile the 
authors’ coding of those personal-injury and foreclosure 
attorneys with their decision to classify as conservative a 
trial attorney who wished to state on his letterhead that he 
was a “certified civil trial specialist.”265) Let us suppose those 
are accurate classifications. What should one do when 
presented with an attorney who holds accounting 
credentials? In Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and 
Professional Regulation,266 Silvia Ibanez—a Florida attorney 
who handles a broad range of matters267—ran into ethics 
problems with the Florida Board of Accountancy (the Board) 
when she placed the letters “CPA” and “CFP” next to her 
name in her telephone-book listing, on her business cards, 
and on her business stationery.268 Those acronyms indicated 
that she was credentialed as a Certified Public Accountant 
and Certified Financial Planner. The Board brought charges 
against her for (among other things) practicing public 
accounting in an unlicensed firm.269 Ibanez contended that 
  
 262. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 16. 
 263. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3166 (coding Florida Bar v. Went for It, 
515 U.S. 618 (1995), concerning personal-injury attorneys); id. at line 1176 
(coding Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988), concerning a 
foreclosure attorney). 
 264. See id. at line 2029 (coding Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993)).  
 265. Peel v. Att’y Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 96-97 
(1990); Codings, supra note 52, at line 1201. 
 266. 512 U.S. 136 (1994). 
 267. See SILVIA S. IBANEZ, PLC, http://ibanezlaw.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). 
I have not been able to locate a record of Ibanez’s practice areas during the 
relevant period twenty years ago. Today, she handles estate planning, small-
business consulting, guardianships, wrongful deaths, and other matters. 
 268. Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 138. 
 269. See id. at 138-42. 
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she was practicing law, not public accounting, and that her 
use of the two acronyms was constitutionally protected 
commercial speech.270 The authors regarded her as a 
conservative speaker.271 Even if it generally is true that 
lawyers lean to the left and CPAs lean to the right, by what 
means can one reliably determine which of those specialties 
trumps the other in the eyes of the justices when a litigant 
has feet planted in both worlds? By saying that she practiced 
law, not accounting, Ibanez herself indicated that her 
primary professional identity was as an attorney. The 
Florida Bar filed an amicus brief in support of Ibanez,272 while 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants filed 
an amicus brief against her.273 
The authors have since indicated that they categorized 
Ibanez as conservative because the case involved “regulating 
commercial speech in the name of preventing fraud.”274 
Suppose one finds that reasoning persuasive. One still has 
reason to wonder whether some of the justices made their in-
group assessments on entirely different grounds, such as the 
fact that Ibanez was a minority female trying to launch her 
own business.275 All things considered, can we be sure that 
the conservative justices regarded Ibanez as ideologically one 
of their own and that liberal justices did not? 
E. Disregarding the Problems that Arise When the 
Ideologies of Speakers’ Speech and Usual Identities 
Diverge 
  
 270. See id. at 142-43. 
 271. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 2729. 
 272. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Florida Bar in Support of Petitioner, Ibanez 
v. Fla. Dep’t Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (No. 93-639). 
 273. See Brief of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t Bus. & Prof’l 
Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (No. 93-639). 
 274. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3715. 
 275. In another fraud-focused case, for example, the authors themselves appear 
to have focused on the usual ideological affiliation of the speaker, rather than on 
the ideological quality of the speech. See infra Part II.E (discussing Milavetz, 
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010)). 
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As I noted when discussing Washington State Grange in 
Part I.C,276 capturing the justices’ own ideological in-group 
and out-group assessments of First Amendment litigants 
takes on an added layer of complexity when people do not 
speak in ways that accord with their usual ideological 
identities. Numerous cases in the authors’ study illustrate 
the problem; I describe several of them in the appended 
footnote.277 Consider, for example, the authors’ handling of 
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States.278 In that 
case, a law firm argued that the First Amendment shielded 
it from being forced to comply with certain provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005.279 Specifically, the firm objected to two ways in which 
the legislation regulates entities that provide bankruptcy 
assistance to consumer debtors: the statute restricts those 
entities’ ability to advise clients to incur additional debt prior 
to filing for bankruptcy,280 and it compels those entities to 
make clear in advertisements and certain other 
communications that they are in the business of helping 
  
 276. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text. 
 277. See, e.g., supra notes 250-54 and accompanying text (discussing the 
authors’ handling of University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990)); 
see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 535 U.S. 
150 (2002) (concerning Jehovah’s Witnesses who wanted to distribute Bibles and 
other religious literature in door-to-door encounters), for which the authors coded 
the speakers as liberal, see Codings, supra note 52, at line 3058; Riley v. Nat’l 
Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (concerning professional fundraisers who 
objected to state limits on the fees they could charge), for which the authors coded 
the speakers as liberal, see Codings, supra note 52, at line 1234; Ark. Writers’ 
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (concerning a general-interest 
magazine’s opposition to a state sales tax), for which the authors coded the 
speaker as liberal, see Codings, supra note 52, at line 1037. This problem of 
divergence also helps to illustrate—but not resolve—the confusion surrounding 
cases in which the authors coded the Democratic Party as conservative or the 
Republican Party as liberal due to the First Amendment claims they advanced. 
See, e.g., supra notes 51-60, 125-42 and accompanying text. When a political party 
with one prevailing ideological affiliation produces speech that might be 
associated with the opposing ideological team, how can we know how an 
opportunistic, bias-driven justice perceived the prevailing ideological tenor of the 
case? 
 278. 559 U.S. 229 (2010). 
 279. See id. at 231-34 (describing the law firm’s claims). 
 280. See 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2012). 
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people file for bankruptcy.281 The latter restriction is aimed 
at preventing the entities from misleadingly advertising that 
they can help individuals obtain debt relief without having to 
go through the pains of bankruptcy.282 A majority of the 
Court—including Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito—
rejected the law firm’s constitutional claims, and the authors 
counted those as votes against a liberal speaker.283 
Did this case really come to the Court from the liberal 
ideological team? The question is difficult to answer because 
the case presents a complication: how should one classify a 
case in which the speaker might usually be regarded as 
liberal but a significant portion of the speech is likely 
conservative, or vice versa? The study’s authors creep up to 
the edge of that question—stating, for example, that “the four 
most conservative Justices are significantly more likely to 
support the free-expression claim when the speaker is 
conservative (or espousing a conservative message) than 
when the speaker is liberal”284—but they do not squarely 
confront it.285 The title of their study declares that they are 
examining whether justices defend “speech”—not 
“speakers”—that they “hate,”286 while at various places 
within their text the authors indicate they are focusing on 
  
 281. See id. §§ 528(a), (b)(2). 
 282. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250 (explaining that the statute’s “required 
disclosures are intended to combat the problem of inherently misleading 
commercial advertisements—specifically, the promise of debt relief without any 
reference to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, which has inherent costs”). 
 283. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4470 (Roberts); id. at line 4502 (Alito). 
 284. Summary, supra note 6, at 4 (emphasis added). 
 285. Cf. PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST 
GROUPS AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 50 (2008) (discussing research that 
tended to show that the Supreme Court heard from conservative groups more 
frequently than commonly supposed, and stating that the value of this research 
was “limited” because the authors “did not categorize the ideological orientations 
of the group’s positions on a case by case basis but instead classified organizations 
[based upon more general criteria]”) (emphasis in original). 
 286. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 1; cf. id. at 13 (stating that “conservative 
justices are less likely to support liberal speech than they are to support 
conservative speech”). 
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the ideological identities of the speakers themselves.287 In the 
chart they prepared for the New York Times, the study’s 
authors conflated the two, providing one column labeled 
“Liberal Speakers/Speech” and another labeled 
“Conservative Speakers/Speech.”288 When presented with a 
case in which the ideologies of the speaker and the speech 
diverge, which of the two trumps the other for purposes of 
determining whether a justice is ideologically biased in favor 
of a First Amendment claimant? 
Milavetz illustrates the difficulty. The speakers in that 
case were the law firm, its president, and one of its 
bankruptcy attorneys. One could fairly contend that 
consumer-bankruptcy attorneys as a whole tend toward the 
ideological left, and a glance at the Milavetz firm’s website—
which states that the firm’s “key practice areas” are personal-
injury, vehicle accidents, bankruptcy, and family law289—
might lead one to assume that at least some of the firm’s 
attorneys tend toward the left, as well. On the other hand, 
one of the key issues in the case concerned the government’s 
effort to force profit-seeking entities like the Milavetz firm to 
make specified disclosures in their advertising, lest 
economically disadvantaged consumers be misled. It seems 
highly unlikely that the law firm’s resistance to that 
compelled speech would strike the justices as liberal in 
nature. As one of the study’s authors has noted elsewhere, 
liberals typically champion the cause of consumers, not the 
businesses with whom those consumers deal.290 Indeed, four 
consumer-protection entities commonly associated with left-
leaning causes joined together in filing an amicus brief in 
support of the Government’s position on the issue, arguing 
  
 287. See, e.g., id. at 2 (“[T]he justices’ votes tend to reflect their preferences 
toward the speakers’ ideological grouping.”). 
 288. See Summary, supra note 6, at 5; supra Table A. 
 289. MILAVETZ, GALLOP & MILAVETZ, P.A., http://www.milavetzlaw.com (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2014). 
 290. See Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, The Rise of Conservative Interest 
Group Litigation, 45 J. POL. 479, 480 (1983) (labeling interest groups as “liberal” 
if they typically represent “the interests of minorities, criminal defendants, or 
consumers” and as “conservative” if they typically represent “the interests of 
employers and business”). 
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that “[e]ven a brief sampling of the myriad disclosure regimes 
upon which much of the nation’s economic activity relies 
illustrates the critical importance of maintaining a 
deferential level of First Amendment review for laws 
requiring factual commercial disclosures.”291 With the firm 
itself possibly tending toward the left and one of the firm’s 
chief speech claims possibly tending toward the right, one 
cannot reliably say that an ideologically motivated justice is 
likely to see the speaker and the speech in Milavetz as both 
being either conservative or liberal. Without knowing 
whether the speaker or the speech is preeminent in the eyes 
of an ideologically opportunistic justice, the case is an 
unreliable basis for assessing justices’ in-group biases. 
F. The Possibility of Unclaimed Speakers 
There are some cases in which one finds speakers whom 
it is difficult to believe any justice would perceive as a values-
sharing, ideological in-group member. We already 
encountered such speakers in Dawson and other cases 
featuring racist expression.292 Is it plausible to believe that 
any justice today would regard as a values-sharing 
ideological teammate a man who trumpets his membership 
in the Aryan Brotherhood, or chooses his young assault 
victim on the basis of the boy’s race, or burns crosses at a 
KKK rally or in the yard of an African-American family? 
There are additional speakers in the study whom one 
assumes no justice would perceive as an ideological ally. 
Consider, for example, United States v. Williams.293 “[U]sing 
a sexually explicit screen name,” Michael Williams entered 
an Internet chat room and declared that he had “good pics” 
of himself with his daughter, that he wanted to swap them 
for other “toddler pics,” and that he possessed photographs of 
  
 291. See Brief of Public Good, the Center for Science in the Public Interest, the 
Environmental Law Foundation, and the Center for Environmental Health as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent United States at 30, Milavetz, Gallop & 
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010) (Nos. 08-1119, 08-1225). 
 292. See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text. 
 293. 553 U.S. 285 (2008). 
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his four-year-old daughter being molested by other men.294 He 
subsequently provided a hyperlink to “seven pictures of 
actual children, aged approximately 5 to 15, engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct and displaying their genitals.”295 
When federal officials later searched his home, agents found 
“two hard drives containing at least 22 images of real 
children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, some of it 
sadomasochistic.”296 When charged with pandering child 
pornography in violation of federal law, he argued that the 
statute at issue was vague and overbroad and that his 
prosecution thus violated the First Amendment.297 Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito both joined Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion rejecting Williams’s claims.298 The authors 
tallied those as votes against a liberal speaker.299 
Acknowledging that it typically is those on the ideological 
left who tend to press sexually oriented speech to its legal 
limits, are we really willing to say that, when it comes to a 
father pandering photographs of men molesting his four-
year-old daughter, conservatives “hate” the speech more than 
liberals, or that liberal justices are likely to see the speaker 
as an ideological teammate—as one who “conforms to [the 
justices’ own] values”—and to “engage in opportunistic 
behavior following from litigant favoritism”?300 Some left-
leaning justices have certainly argued that adults ought to be 
able to make their own expressive choices in the realm of 
adult, consensual obscenity,301 and some justices have found 
  
 294. Id. at 291 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 295. Id.  
 296. Id. at 291-92. 
 297. See id. at 289-306. 
 298. See id. at 287. 
 299. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4466 (Roberts); id. at line 4499 (Alito). 
 300. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 1, 3, 6. 
 301. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 112-13 (1973) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile I cannot say that the interests of the State—
apart from the question of juveniles and unconsenting adults—are trivial or 
nonexistent, I am compelled to conclude that these interests cannot justify the 
substantial damage to constitutional rights and to this Nation’s judicial 
machinery that inevitably results from state efforts to bar the distribution even 
of unprotected material to consenting adults.”). 
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a First Amendment right to possess and distribute non-
obscene yet sexually explicit computer-generated images of 
children.302 But no jurist has argued that adults ought to be 
left free to make their own expressive choices in the realm of 
pornography that involves the sexual exploitation of toddlers. 
This surely is speech that all justices “hate.” As Justice 
Kennedy put it in a 2002 opinion joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, “[t]he sexual abuse of a child 
is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral 
instincts of a decent people.”303 To the extent one aims to 
determine whether justices have an in-group bias in favor of 
ideologically likeminded speakers and a corresponding 
antipathy to speakers who belong to the opposing ideological 
team, I would have thought that Williams is best left on the 
sidelines. 
It is similarly difficult to imagine any justice regarding 
the speakers in Snyder v. Phelps304 as ideological teammates 
worthy of opportunistic favoritism. The First Amendment 
claimants in that case were Fred Phelps and other members 
of the infamous Westboro Baptist Church.305 At a funeral for 
a United States Marine who was killed while serving in Iraq, 
Phelps and some of his fellow parishioners gathered near the 
site of the funeral and held signs carrying such messages as 
“‘God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,’ ‘America is 
Doomed,’ ‘Don’t Pray for the USA,’ ‘Thank God for IEDs,’ 
‘Thank God for Dead Soldiers,’ ‘Pope in Hell,’ ‘Priests Rape 
Boys,’ ‘God Hates Fags,’ ‘You’re Going to Hell,’ and ‘God 
Hates You.’”306 When the Marine’s father brought a variety of 
tort claims against Phelps and the church, those speakers 
raised the First Amendment as a defense.307 Led by Chief 
  
 302. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 246-51 (2002). 
 303. Id. at 244. 
 304. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 305. Id. at 1213. 
 306. Id.  
 307. See id. at 1214. 
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Justice Roberts, the Court ruled in the speakers’ favor,308 with 
Justice Alito filing a lone dissent.309 The authors coded those 
as votes, respectively, for and against conservative 
speakers.310 
Does it indeed seem likely that the conservative justices 
saw Phelps and the other Westboro Baptist picketers as 
values-sharing ideological allies? That seems like an 
untenable assumption when one considers how the picketers 
framed their anti-homosexuality message—in language 
condemning the United States and celebrating the deaths of 
American soldiers, objects of patriotism to which 
conservatives certainly cede nothing to liberals in the degree 
of their attachment. As Chief Justice Roberts gently put it in 
his closing remarks, “Westboro believes that America is 
morally flawed; many Americans might feel the same about 
Westboro.”311 
G. Handling Litigants’ Successive Appearances 
Suppose a litigant appears before the Court twice in close 
succession concerning the same set of legal issues during the 
course of a single lawsuit. If a justice votes for the litigant on 
both occasions, does one have twice as much evidence of bias 
in favor of that litigant’s ideological team as one would have 
if the litigant had appeared only once? 
In a dispute with the Federal Election Commission 
concerning corporations’ First Amendment freedom to 
produce political speech, Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., came 
to the Court twice in successive Terms—first to argue that 
the district court’s dismissal of its claim was founded upon 
an erroneous reading of the Court’s campaign-finance 
  
 308. See id. at 1220 (“As a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful 
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice 
requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case.”). 
 309. See id. at 1229 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[Phelps’s and the church’s] 
outrageous conduct caused [the father] great injury, and the Court now 
compounds that injury by depriving [the father] of a judgment that acknowledges 
the wrong he suffered.”). 
 310. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4453 (Roberts); id. at line 4496 (Alito). 
 311. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
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precedent,312 and then again the following year when the FEC 
challenged the district court’s ruling in favor of Wisconsin 
Right to Life on the merits.313 On both occasions, Chief Justice 
Roberts sided with Wisconsin Right to Life. The authors 
coded those as two separate instances in which he voted in 
favor of conservative speakers.314 
Treating a justice’s successive encounters with the same 
speaker in the same litigation as if they were encounters with 
different litigants in different cases is problematic because it 
raises questions about whether the variables are as 
independent of one another as their separate treatment 
presupposes. Both of the Wisconsin Right to Life cases 
concerned the same speaker, wishing to produce the same 
political speech, running up against the same body of federal 
regulation, litigating against the same governmental entity 
during the course of the same lawsuit. If Wisconsin Right to 
Life had returned to the Court five times during the lifespan 
of that litigation, would we confidently count those 
appearances as five separate data points for assessing the 
justices’ susceptibility to ideological in-group bias? If not, we 
probably should not count them even twice. 
III. REASSESSING THE EVIDENCE OF BIAS: JUSTICE ALITO AND 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS 
What do these sorts of difficulties mean for the authors’ 
bottom-line assessments of individual justices? Because 
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts cast the fewest 
number of votes of all the Roberts Court justices in the study, 
one can readily assess their voting histories for oneself. For 
each of those two conservatives, Professors Epstein, Parker, 
and Segal concluded there was a wide, statistically 
significant disparity in his support for conservative and 
liberal speakers.315 As I indicated above in Table A, the 
  
 312. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 313. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 314. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4463; id. at line 4468. 
 315. Although those two justices’ votes were sufficiently numerous to generate 
a finding of a statistically significant disparity, the authors found that they could 
not “estimate the full statistical model for” those two justices because they had 
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authors found that liberal speakers won Justice Alito’s vote 
in only 9.1% of the cases in which they appeared, while 
conservatives comparatively flourished with a success rate of 
53.9%. For Chief Justice Roberts, those numbers were 
similarly skewed, with liberals and conservatives securing 
his vote 15.4% and 64.3% of the time, respectively.316 The 
evidence does not support those dramatic findings. 
The authors identified 24 free-expression cases in which 
Justice Alito cast votes during the study’s time period.317 Of 
those 24 cases, the authors classified 13 as involving 
conservative speakers and 11 as involving liberal speakers. 
Chief Justice Roberts cast votes in 27 free-expression cases 
within the study, with conservatives and liberals appearing 
in 14 and 13 of those cases (in the authors’ judgment), 
respectively. Placed into those two groupings, here are the 
cases, together with the authors’ determination of whether 




of Alito’s Vote 
Authors’ Coding 
of Roberts’s Vote 
Citizens United, Inc. v. FEC318 For Speaker For Speaker 
Locke v. Karass319 Against Speaker Against Speaker 
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n 
v. Brentwood Acad.320 
Against Speaker Against Speaker 
United States v. Stevens321 Against Speaker For Speaker 
  
not cast votes in a sufficiently large number of cases. See Summary, supra note 6, 
at 4-5 & n.5. 
 316. See supra Table A. 
 317. See Codings, supra note 52, at lines 4480-503. 
 318. 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (concerning corporate expenditures on political 
speech); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4480 (Alito); id. at line 4473 (Roberts). 
 319. 555 U.S. 207 (2009) (concerning the speech of nonunion employees); see 
Codings, supra note 52, at line 4481 (Alito); id. at line 4474 (Roberts). 
 320. 551 U.S. 291 (2007) (concerning the football-recruiting speech of a private 
high school); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4482 (Alito); id. at line 4467 
(Roberts). 
 321. 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (concerning video recordings of animal-on-animal 
violence); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4485 (Alito); id. at line 4477 
(Roberts). 
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Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan322 Against Speaker Against Speaker 
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party323 
For Speaker Against Speaker 
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.324 For Speaker For Speaker 
Doe v. Reed325 Against Speaker Against Speaker 
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.326 For Speaker For Speaker 
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett327 
For Speaker For Speaker 
Randall v. Sorrell328 For Speaker For Speaker 
Snyder v. Phelps329 Against Speaker For Speaker 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n330 For Speaker For Speaker 
Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC331 N/A For Speaker 
Table B: Speakers Classified by the Authors as Conservative 
  
 322. 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011) (concerning a city council member’s vote on a real-
estate development proposal); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4486 (Alito); id. 
at line 4469 (Roberts). 
 323. 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (discussed supra Part I.C); see Codings, supra note 52, 
at line 4487 (Alito); id. at line 4457 (Roberts). 
 324. 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (discussed supra Part II.G); see Codings, supra note 52, 
at line 4490 (Alito); id. at line 4463 (Roberts). 
 325. 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (concerning the rights of individuals opposed to same-
sex marriage); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4491 (Alito); id. at line 4461 
(Roberts). 
 326. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (concerning pharmacies’ and data miners’ right to 
provide information to pharmaceuticals for marketing purposes); see Codings, 
supra note 52, at line 4493 (Alito); id. at line 4476 (Roberts). 
 327. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (concerning Republican politicians’ objection to a 
state’s campaign-finance system); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4494 (Alito); 
id. at line 4454 (Roberts). 
 328. 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (concerning Republican politicians’ objection to limits 
on campaign contributions and expenditures); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 
4495 (Alito); id. at line 4464 (Roberts). 
 329. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (concerning an anti-homosexuality protest at a 
military funeral) (discussed supra Part II.F); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 
4496 (Alito); id. at line 4453 (Roberts). 
 330. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (discussed supra at notes 229-44); see Codings, supra 
note 52, at line 4497 (Alito); id. at line 4465 (Roberts). 
 331. 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (discussed supra Part II.G); see Codings, supra note 52, 
at line 4468 (Roberts). 
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Case 
Authors’ Coding 
of Alito’s Vote 
Authors’ Coding 
of Roberts’s Vote 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project332 
Against Speaker Against Speaker 
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez 
Torres333 
Against Speaker Against Speaker 
Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n334 Against Speaker Against Speaker 
Davis v. FEC335 For Speaker For Speaker 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum336 Against Speaker Against Speaker 
Morse v. Frederick337 Against Speaker Against Speaker 
United States v. Williams338 Against Speaker Against Speaker 
Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n339 Against Speaker Against Speaker 
Garcetti v. Ceballos340 Against Speaker Against Speaker 
  
 332. 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (concerning the provision of aid for the humanitarian 
functions of terrorist organizations); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4483 
(Alito); id. at line 4460 (Roberts). 
 333. 552 U.S. 196 (2008) (discussed supra at notes 125-31); see Codings, supra 
note 52, at line 4484 (Alito); id. at line 4456 (Roberts). 
 334. 551 U.S. 177 (2007) (concerning the consent a union must obtain to use 
employees’ fees for political and ideological purposes); see Codings, supra note 52, 
at line 4488 (Alito); id. at line 4478 (Roberts). 
 335. 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (concerning a Democratic politician’s objection to a 
state’s campaign-finance system); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4489 (Alito); 
id. at line 4472 (Roberts). 
 336. 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (concerning a nontraditional religion’s effort to erect a 
permanent display in a city park); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4492 (Alito); 
id. at line 4458 (Roberts). 
 337. 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (concerning a student’s display of an apparently pro-
drug message); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4498 (Alito); id. at line 4479 
(Roberts). 
 338. 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (discussed supra at notes 293-303); see Codings, supra 
note 52, at line 4499 (Alito); id. at line 4466 (Roberts). 
 339. 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (concerning a union’s objection to a state law limiting 
payroll deductions to fund the union’s political activities); see Codings, supra note 
52, at line 4500 (Alito); id. at line 4475 (Roberts). 
 340. 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (concerning a whistleblower employee’s adverse 
treatment by his state employer); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4501 (Alito); 
id. at line 4459 (Roberts). 
62 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. 
United States341 
Against Speaker Against Speaker 
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri342 Against Speaker Against Speaker 
Beard v. Banks343 N/A For Speaker 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc.344 
N/A Against Speaker 
Table C: Speakers Classified by the Authors as Liberal 
 
At first blush, the evidence of Justice Alito’s ideological 
in-group bias appears strong. For reasons I have identified, 
however, the authors’ handling of some of the relevant cases 
is problematic. The authors likely erred when they 
simplistically classified New York State Board of Elections v. 
Lopez Torres as a case involving liberal speech.345 They 
categorized Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States as a 
case involving a liberal speaker, even though one of the law 
firm’s central speech claims was of a sort commonly 
associated with conservatives.346 They categorized the 
speaker in United States v. Williams as liberal, even though 
there is no basis for believing that liberals look more 
tolerantly than conservatives on a father pandering 
photographs of other men sexually abusing his young 
daughter, and they categorized the speakers in Synder v. 
Phelps as conservative, even though there is no basis for 
believing that conservative justices would look preferentially 
upon speakers who celebrate terrorist attacks and the deaths 
of American soldiers.347 They categorized Borough of Duryea 
  
 341. 559 U.S. 229 (2010) (discussed supra Part II.E); see Codings, supra note 52, 
at line 4502 (Alito); id. at line 4470 (Roberts). 
 342. 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011) (discussed supra at notes 111-18, 222-28); see 
Codings, supra note 52, at line 4503 (Alito); id. at line 4455 (Roberts). 
 343. 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (discussed supra at notes 88-95); see Codings, supra 
note 52, at line 4471 (Roberts). 
 344. 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (concerning law schools’ objection to hosting military 
recruiters with policies adverse to homosexuality); see Codings, supra note 52, at 
line 4462 (Roberts). 
 345. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text. 
 346. See supra Part II.E. 
 347. See supra Part II.F. 
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v. Guarnieri as a case involving a liberal speaker, even 
though there is reason to suppose that conservative justices 
might have looked favorably upon the chief of police who was 
claiming a violation of his First Amendment rights.348 They 
categorized the videogame makers and sellers in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Association as conservative, even 
though noteworthy ideological conservatives lined up to 
defend the speech-restricting California law and noteworthy 
ideological liberals lined up to support the purveyors of 
controversial entertainment.349 And the authors erred twice 
in their handling of Washington State Grange v. Washington 
State Republican Party, first by simplistically coding the case 
as involving conservative speech, and then by coding Justice 
Alito as voting in the speakers’ favor.350 
How would Justice Alito’s voting record appear if we 
removed Lopez Torres, Milavetz, Williams, Snyder, 
Guarnieri, and Washington State Grange as not reliably 
probative on the issue of justices’ in-group biases, and moved 
Entertainment Merchants Association to the liberal-speaker 
side of the balance sheet? The gap between his support for 
conservative and liberal speakers would narrow to a 
difference of 50% support for the ten conservatives and 25% 
for the eight liberals. The numbers with which we now are 
dealing are so small that the raw difference is not 
statistically significant. And even those raw numbers might 
not be what they seem. Might anything other than in-group 
bias account for the remaining apparent difference? 
Take a look at Justice Alito’s votes in cases involving 
campaign finance. There are five such cases—four in the 
conservative camp (Citizens United, Inc. v. FEC; FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.; Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett; and Randall v. Sorrell) and 
one in the liberal camp (Davis v. FEC). In each of those five 
cases, Justice Alito voted in favor of the speaker. Some might 
explain that consistent voting pattern by suggesting that 
Justice Alito believes campaign-finance restrictions 
disadvantage Republicans, and so he takes any chance he 
  
 348. See supra notes 111-18, 222-28 and accompanying text. 
 349. See supra notes 229-44 and accompanying text. 
 350. See supra Part I.C. 
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gets to hold such restrictions unconstitutional, even when—
as in Davis—the immediate beneficiary is a Democrat. 
Justice Alito himself would surely say he has a nonpartisan 
view of political speech and the First Amendment, and this 
view renders campaign-finance restrictions especially 
vulnerable to constitutional attacks, no matter whom those 
restrictions benefit or burden in a given case. If one brackets 
that disagreement about the campaign-finance cases for a 
moment and looks at the balance of Justice Alito’s record, one 
finds there is virtually no raw difference at all in his support 
for conservative and liberal speakers in the tiny number of 
remaining cases, with votes for conservatives in 1 of 6 cases 
and votes for liberals in 1 of 7. It is the campaign-finance 
cases, in other words, that drive the seeming disparity in his 
voting record—and when a Democrat appeared before him in 
a campaign-finance case, that speaker won Justice Alito’s 
vote.  
After accounting for the problems in the authors’ 
handling of Chief Justice Roberts’ voting record, one finds 
that the campaign-finance cases again play a powerful role. 
The authors found that Chief Justice Roberts voted in favor 
of liberal speakers in 15.4% of the cases in which they 
appeared, but that conservative speakers fared substantially 
better with a success rate of 64.3%.351 Consider what 
happens, however, if we again remove Washington State 
Grange, Lopez Torres, Milavetz, Guarnieri, Snyder, and 
Williams on the grounds already stated;352 again realign the 
videogame makers and sellers in Entertainment Merchants 
Association with the ideological liberals;353 count Wisconsin 
Right to Life only once, rather than twice, for the campaign-
finance lawsuit that brought it to the Court in successive 
Terms;354 and correct the authors’ mistaken finding that 
Chief Justice Roberts voted in favor of the state prisoner in 
Beard.355 
  
 351. See supra Table A. 
 352. See supra notes 345-50 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra notes 229-44 and accompanying text. 
 354. See supra Part II.G. 
 355. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
2015] EPSTEIN-PARKER-SEGAL CRITIQUE 65 
With those changes, the difference between Chief Justice 
Roberts’s support for conservative and liberal speakers 
initially does not appear to change much, with 60% support 
for the former and 20% support for the latter. That difference 
remains statistically significant. But we now are dealing with 
such small numbers (10 cases involving conservative 
speakers and 10 involving liberals) that the campaign-
finance cases again loom particularly large. Just as we did 
with Justice Alito, let us briefly bracket the debate about why 
he voted for the speakers in the campaign-finance cases, so 
that we can assess the balance of his voting history. We 
would be left with a record in which he voted for conservative 
speakers on 2 of 6 occasions (with neither of those two 
winning sets of speakers—a seller of dog-attack videos in one 
case and pharmacies and their data miners in the other—
being quintessential ideological conservatives of the sort the 
authors described when explaining their coding criteria), 
while voting for liberal speakers on 1 of 9. That difference is 
not statistically significant. Errors and questionable 
judgments aside, it is the campaign-finance cases—in which 
Chief Justice Roberts treated ideologically diverse litigants 
even-handedly—that account for most of the apparent 
disparity in his voting record. 
The evidence of Justice Alito’s and Chief Justice 
Roberts’s susceptibility to in-group bias grows no stronger 
when one looks at matters from the perspective of the rule-
of-law principles that are at stake. Professors Epstein, 
Parker, and Segal argue that the justices’ “in-group 
favoritism” stands in strong tension with “the carving on the 
main portico of their building promising equal justice under 
law” and with “claims about the justices’ broader concern 
with following and building precedent (seemingly difficult to 
do when they reach dissimilar decisions in suits 
differentiated only by the nature of the parties).”356 
Fundamental principles about our legal system are indeed at 
stake here. Are Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts 
indeed reaching differing decisions in cases that are 
distinguishable from one another “only by the nature of the 
parties”? 
  
 356. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 16 (emphasis added). 
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As I have noted, both justices have been consistently 
hostile to campaign-finance regulations, treating the 
Democratic speaker who appeared before them just as 
favorably as they treated a handful of Republicans. Once one 
starts to compare the few other cases that remain in the pool, 
arguably meaningful factual and legal differences begin to 
abound, and the window of opportunity for confidently 
charging a justice with bias narrows even further. 
At the end of the day, therefore, Professors Epstein, 
Parker, and Segal’s monolithic conclusions about the Court’s 
currently sitting conservatives—the conclusions on which 
reporters and bloggers seized most powerfully—are not well 
founded. The evidence of ideological in-group bias in Justice 
Alito’s chambers is arguably non-existent, while the evidence 
of bias in Chief Justice Roberts’s chambers is only marginally 
stronger. 
IV. IN-GROUP BIAS AND MOTIVATED REASONING OFF THE 
COURT 
In light of the difficulties in Professors Epstein, Parker, 
and Segal’s study, we find ourselves confronting an ironic 
twist: working in tandem with the temptations of motivated 
reasoning, the very same sort of biases that the authors 
aimed to measure on the Court may have helped predispose 
many writers and readers to be too quick to embrace the 
study’s uniformly damning critique of the Court’s currently 
sitting conservatives. 
In-group biases can shape our perceptions of the justices 
just as surely as in-group biases can shape the justices’ 
perceptions of litigants. As Jonathan Haidt has explained, 
“[p]eople bind themselves into political teams that share 
moral narratives. Once they accept a particular narrative, 
they become blind to alternative moral worlds.”357 Among 
many who self-identify as liberal, a common narrative about 
the Court’s staunchest conservatives is that they are yoked 
in stubborn service to an ideological agenda, shunning 
  
 357. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY 
POLITICS AND RELIGION xvi (2012); see also id. at 107-09 (providing a biographical 
example of Haidt’s own experience with this worldview). 
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precedent and any other constraining force that 
inconveniently gets in the way.358 Of course, many who self-
identify as conservative embrace a comparable narrative 
about the Court’s liberals.359 Both ideological camps claim the 
mantle of judicial integrity and aim to hang the millstone of 
judicial activism around the necks of the other. 
For many liberals, therefore, the authors’ study will 
simply illustrate the truth of what they already believed: 
across the board, today’s conservative justices are far less 
faithful to the rule of law than their liberal counterparts. The 
study’s conclusions have the added appeal of painting all of 
the Court’s current conservatives with the same unflattering 
brush, while finding that none of the currently sitting liberal 
justices in the study manifests statistically significant 
evidence of ideological in-group bias. The study thereby 
provides a vocabulary with which liberals who are so inclined 
can reaffirm the virtues of the justices they regard as their 
own and categorically demonize the justices whom they 
regard as their ideological adversaries.360 Categorical 
generalizations about the Court’s conservatives are made all 
the more seductive by virtue of what social-psychologists call 
the out-group homogeneity effect—the tendency in many 
circumstances to perceive that members of an in-group are 
diverse but that members of an out-group are all the same.361  
In-group bias is not the only likely reason for the study’s 
easy reception in many circles; the more wide-ranging power 
of motivated reasoning may play a role, as well. Whether one 
finds a given item of evidence persuasive can depend to a 
significant degree on whether that evidence comports or 
  
 358. That narrative will be familiar to anyone who has followed the debate 
about Citizens United, Inc. v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 359. That narrative will be familiar to anyone who has followed the debate 
about Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 360. Cf. HAIDT, supra note 357, at 85 (“We can believe almost anything that 
supports our team.”). 
 361. See Mark Rubin & Constantina Badea, They’re All the Same! . . . But for 
Several Different Reasons: A Review of the Multicausal Nature of Perceived Group 
Variability, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 367, 368 (2012) (stating that 
this is “a robust and widespread phenomenon, [but] by no means ubiquitous”). 
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conflicts with beliefs to which one already is committed.362 
Discomfiting though it is to confess, we are most likely to 
believe what we want to believe.363 That is true both of those 
who consume scholarship and of those who produce it. 
Consumers of scholarship may fall prey, for example, to a 
disconfirmation bias—a tendency to accept quickly and 
uncritically those arguments that appear to confirm what one 
already believes, and to discount arguments that cast the 
truth of those beliefs in doubt.364 Researchers have found, for 
example, that test subjects frequently take longer to 
mentally process arguments that challenge their beliefs—not 
because they are open-mindedly reconsidering their own 
commitments, but because they are devoting time and 
mental resources to finding fault with arguments that lead 
in undesired directions.365 Adam Liptak’s opening paragraph 
  
 362. See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: 
The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099-100 (1979) (discussing the authors’ 
influential study of test subjects’ evaluation of arguments concerning the death 
penalty’s deterrent effect). In one study, for example, researchers found that 
undergraduate and law students tended to construe the same legal precedents 
differently, in keeping with their own policy preferences. See Eileen Braman & 
Thomas E. Nelson, Mechanisms of Motivated Reasoning? Analogical Perception 
in Discrimination Disputes, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 940, 954-55 (2007); cf. David A. 
Hyman, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits Against 
PPACA?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 805, 824-28 (arguing that the forces of motivated 
reasoning prevented many scholars from recognizing the constitutional 
vulnerabilities of President Obama’s signature healthcare legislation). 
 363. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 
495 (1990) (“People are more likely to arrive at those conclusions that they want 
to arrive at.”). 
 364. See, e.g., April A. Strickland et al., Motivated Reasoning and Public 
Opinion, 36 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 935, 938 (2011) (reaching this conclusion 
following a study involving arguments about gun control and affirmative action); 
see also Lord et al., supra note 362, at 2099 (“[I]ndividuals will dismiss and 
discount empirical evidence that contradicts their initial views but will derive 
support from evidence, of no greater probativeness, that seems consistent with 
their views.”). 
 365. See, e.g., Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A Disconfirmation Bias in the 
Evaluation of Arguments, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 18 (1996) 
(reporting the results of a study in which test subjects were asked to assess a 
variety of public-policy issues); Charles S. Taber & Milton Lodge, Motivated 
Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 755, 761-63 
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in the New York Times—a paragraph casting Justice Scalia 
as one of the study’s chief villains366—may have been all that 
some readers needed to hear in order to conclude that all of 
the study’s findings were accurate. 
Scholars too, of course, are susceptible to these sorts of 
analytic pitfalls. Like everyone else, we can be too quick to 
accept data that appear to support the theses we wish to 
advance, and too slow to accept data that cut against us. We 
also have to fend off what psychologists call a confirmation 
bias—a tendency to seek out information that supports the 
conclusions we wish to reach and to interpret ambiguous 
information in ways favorable to those same conclusions.367 
In a study of the sort we are examining here, for example, 
there is a risk that—absent precautions to prevent it—those 
who are coding the data might inadvertently rely at least in 
part upon particular justices’ votes when trying to determine 
speakers’ ideological affiliations (e.g., presuming that if 
Justice X voted against the litigant, then the litigant likely 
belongs to one ideological camp rather than the other).368 
Data-coders might also inadvertently allow speakers’ 
ideological affiliations to reduce the care with which they try 
to determine how particular justices actually voted (e.g., 
presuming that if the litigant belongs to a given ideological 
camp, then Justice X likely voted against her). More 
generally, if they do the coding themselves—rather than 
provide a detailed written protocol to disinterested 
  
(2006) (reporting the results of a study in which test subjects were asked to assess 
arguments concerning affirmative action and gun control). 
 366. See Liptak, supra note 2; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text 
(discussing Liptak’s coverage of the study). 
 367. See HAIDT, supra note 357, at 79-80 (defining “confirmation bias” as “the 
tendency to seek out and interpret new evidence in ways that confirm what you 
already think”); Taber & Lodge, supra note 365, at 763-64 (reporting the results 
of a study in which test subjects were allowed to choose from among a variety of 
differently slanted sources of information concerning affirmative action and gun 
control). 
 368. Cf. Anna Harvey & Michael J. Woodruff, Confirmation Bias in the United 
States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 420-29 (2013) 
(arguing that confirmation bias—instigated by perceptions of the Court’s 
ideological leanings at the time decisions were rendered—may help to explain 
curious ways in which certain data were coded for the Supreme Court Database). 
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individuals and ask them to code the ideologies of the cases’ 
speech and speakers—those conducting a study of this sort 
open themselves to the possibility of bias-laden observer 
effects, in which the experimenters’ hopes and expectations 
influence what they believe they are seeing.369 Of course, if 
any of those were to occur, the study’s ultimate conclusions 
would, in self-fulfilling fashion, overstate the evidence of in-
group bias. 
CONCLUSION: LARGER LESSONS AND THE PATH AHEAD 
In Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal’s widely 
publicized study of justices’ in-group biases in First 
Amendment free-expression cases, the Court’s four most 
conservative members—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—come off looking by far the worst 
among the justices serving on the Court today. Not 
surprisingly, the conservative justices’ uniformly poor 
performance provided the focal point for much of the press’s 
and blogosphere’s coverage.370 Beneath the authors’ 
conclusions regarding those and other justices, however, one 
finds a range of problems. With varying degrees of frequency, 
the authors erroneously included cases having nothing to do 
with free expression; ignored crucial facts about the speakers 
and their First Amendment claims when appraising 
speakers’ ideological identities; erroneously coded the ways 
in which justices actually voted; assigned ideological 
identities to speakers in the face of facts that could lead a 
reasonable person to make a different judgment; disregarded 
the difficulties that arise when a speaker affiliated with one 
ideological camp asserts a speech claim commonly associated 
with the other; included cases in which it is difficult to 
imagine any justice regarding the speaker as a member of his 
or her own ideological team; and, in at least one instance, 
treated a speaker who appeared twice before the Court 
during the course of the same litigation as if that speaker 
were two different litigants. Taken together, I found one or 
  
 369. See D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of 
Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and 
Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6-27 (2002) (providing an overview of observer 
effects). 
 370. See, e.g., supra notes 2, 9-14 and accompanying text. 
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more such difficulties in 25% of the 159 cases I reviewed, 
covering all of the cases in the study from 1987 forward. One 
thus has ample reason to believe that numerous additional 
difficulties afflict the authors’ treatment of many of the other 
cases in their study. 
It is possible, of course, that although the authors’ 
analyses of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were 
negatively affected by coding errors and questionable 
judgments, those difficulties are distributed throughout the 
larger study in such a way that the authors’ bottom-line 
judgments about some of the other current and former 
justices would not be meaningfully affected by the problems’ 
correction. In early work on this Article, for example, I 
started to examine whether problems corrupted the authors’ 
evaluation of Justice Scalia, who cast more votes than any 
other currently sitting justice in the study.371 As the number 
of errors and debatable classifications in those cases grew 
(many of which worked to Justice Scalia’s detriment but 
others to his benefit), and as my own uncertainties about how 
to classify some of those speakers accumulated, I abandoned 
the effort to make and defend a fine-grained assessment of 
his sizable voting record, comparable to what I have offered 
for Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito (the two justices 
in the study with the fewest total number of votes). My sense 
is that Justice Scalia might benefit from a correction of the 
kinds of problems I have identified, but perhaps not to a large 
degree.372 One would indeed expect that, the larger a justice’s 
  
 371. See supra Table A. 
 372. The authors’ treatment of Justice Scalia does, however, raise a question in 
addition to those I already have discussed. Of the 92 cases in which the authors 
determined that Justice Scalia encountered liberal speakers, more than one-fifth 
involved speech of a sexual nature (obscenity, child pornography, nude dancing, 
and the like). If the data set were adjusted to take account of the other criticisms 
I have made, those sexual-speech cases might make up an even larger fraction of 
the liberal-speaker cases. The authors coded the speakers in all of those sexual-
speech cases as liberal, and Justice Scalia cast anti-speaker votes in almost all of 
them. If all speakers who produce a given species of speech are coded as members 
of one ideological group precisely because they produced that species of speech, 
and if there are plausible constitutional reasons to treat that species of speech 
more harshly than many others—as Justice Scalia has claimed is true of at least 
some forms of sexual expression—then it is not clear how heavily one can rely 
upon those cases to determine whether, across the board, a justice is “reach[ing] 
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voting record, the greater the likelihood that even a sizable 
number of erroneous or readily debatable coding decisions 
will wash out, so long as the errors are not skewed to the 
advantage or disadvantage of that justice’s ideological group. 
If that is the case here, the individual justices in the authors’ 
study may vary greatly in the degree to which they would 
benefit from a reassessment. Given the ease with which 
many of the study’s problems could have been avoided, it is 
unfortunate that the trustworthiness of the study’s justice-
specific findings is left to depend upon such speculation by 
the reader. 
Some of the difficulties in the authors’ study might be 
related to problems that reportedly trouble the database that 
provided Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal with their 
starting point.373 The publicly available Supreme Court 
Database is widely used by scholars conducting empirical 
analyses of the Court and of the justices’ voting patterns,374 
but its contents are not beyond criticism.375 Suspicious that 
the database’s coding protocols were yielding inaccurate 
information about whether the outcomes of the Court’s cases 
were ideologically conservative or liberal in nature, for 
example, Professor Carolyn Shapiro selected ninety-five 
  
dissimilar decisions in suits differentiated only by the nature of the parties.” 
Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 16; see generally City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, 
541 U.S. 774, 787 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he pandering 
of sex is not protected by the First Amendment.”); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 
U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The traditional 
power of government to foster good morals (bonos mores), and the acceptability of 
the traditional judgment . . . that nude public dancing itself is immoral, have not 
been repealed by the First Amendment.”); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 
514 U.S. 334, 372 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]here is no doubt” 
that laws barring obscenity do not violate the First Amendment because such 
laws “existed and were universally approved in 1791”). 
 373. See supra note 3 (noting the authors’ use of the Supreme Court Database). 
 374. See Lee Epstein, Introduction: Social Science, the Courts, and the Law, 83 
JUDICATURE 224, 225 (2000) (“There is little doubt that today [the] U.S. Supreme 
Court Judicial Data Base is the greatest single resource of data on the Court; 
there are virtually no social-scientific projects on the Court that fail to draw on 
it.”). 
 375. I already have pointed out that quirks in the database caused irrelevant 
cases to appear in the authors’ data set. See supra Part II.A. 
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cases at random and recoded them herself.376 Among those 
ninety-five cases, she found thirty-five—nearly 37% of the 
total—whose outcomes the database simplistically coded in 
binary fashion as either conservative or liberal, but for which 
Professor Shapiro believed both conservative and liberal 
dimensions could readily be found.377 Judge Richard Posner 
has gone through a similar exercise, examining 110 randomly 
selected cases in the database; he concluded that the coded 
outcomes in 25% of those cases were problematic.378 In a 
separate analysis of the database’s contents, Professor 
Shapiro located cases whose legal issues she believed had 
been misclassified, she identified problems flowing from the 
coders’ reported reliance upon summaries of the cases rather 
than upon the texts that the justices themselves write, and 
she found instances in which coders failed to follow the 
database’s own protocols.379 Professor Anna Harvey and one 
of her graduate students have argued that confirmation 
bias—instigated by perceptions of the Court’s ideological 
leanings at the time decisions were rendered—may help to 
explain curious ways in which some of the database’s 
contents have been coded.380 
Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal are aware of the 
database’s limitations,381 and so one presumes they took steps 
to ensure that those limitations did not infect their own 
analysis. They did examine the information they retrieved 
  
 376. See Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical 
Legal Scholarship, 75 MO. L. REV. 79, 94-100 (2010) [hereinafter Shapiro, Context 
of Ideology]. For a description of the protocol that the coders for the Supreme 
Court Database use when determining whether the outcome of a case is 
conservative or liberal, see Online Code Book: Decision Direction, supra note 48. 
 377. Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 376, at 100. 
 378. EPSTEIN ET AL., BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES, supra note 8, at 105, 150.  
 379. See Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical 
Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 494-500 (2009) [hereinafter 
Shapiro, Coding Complexity]. 
 380. See Harvey & Woodruff, supra note 368, at 420-29; see also supra notes 
367-69 and accompanying text (discussing confirmation bias). 
 381. See EPSTEIN ET AL., BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES, supra note 8, at 105 
(discussing some of Professor Shapiro’s criticisms of the Supreme Court 
Database); id. at 150 (discussing Judge Posner’s test of the database’s ideological 
classifications). 
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from the database before putting those data to work, 
explaining, for example, that “[t]o ensure consistency with 
our First Amendment concerns, we rechecked the coding of 
all votes and made alterations as necessary.”382 Numerous 
problems nevertheless appear in their study, leaving one to 
speculate about those problems’ origins. The kinds of 
difficulties that Professor Shapiro identified in the Supreme 
Court Database—misclassified cases, overly simplistic 
designations of phenomena as conservative or liberal, coding 
cases without carefully attending to the texts of the cases 
themselves, failing to apply a consistent set of coding 
standards to ensure that like cases are treated alike—all 
bear a resemblance to the sorts of problems one encounters 
in Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal’s study. Moreover, 
the rate at which I found difficulties in the authors’ 
treatment of individual cases approximates the rate at which 
Judge Posner found problems in the database. If there is 
indeed a causal relationship here, Professor Shapiro’s 
warning bears revisiting: “Put bluntly, rather than 
illuminate the workings of the Supreme Court, some 
empirical findings may reflect the way the Database reports 
(or, in the language of empirical analysis, ‘codes’) 
information—or whether it reports certain types of 
information at all.”383  
If there is not, in fact, a direct causal relationship 
between the limitations of the Supreme Court Database and 
the problems in this study—that is, if researchers are 
independently producing data with the same sorts of 
shortcomings—then it probably is time to take a second look 
at the data-handling norms that generally prevail among 
those who gather and report data of this sort. As I noted when 
discussing the authors’ mishandling of numerous cases,384 for 
example, it appears that Professors Epstein, Parker, and 
Segal opted not to consider all of the relevant and readily 
available facts in (at least some of) the cases whose speakers 
and speech they were classifying, apparently choosing to rely 
instead upon case captions or superficial case summaries. As 
  
 382. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 8. 
 383. Shapiro, Coding Complexity, supra note 379, at 480. 
 384. See supra Parts I.C, II. 
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Professor Shapiro pointed out in her criticism of the Supreme 
Court Database’s coders on similar grounds,385 failing to 
attend to the justices’ written opinions can lead to problems. 
Relatedly, the study’s authors appear to have paid little (if 
any) attention to the information contained in the briefs and 
other litigation documents for the cases they were coding, or 
to the identities and ideological affiliations of amici curiae, 
all of which (like the texts of the justices’ decisions) can 
provide information that is relevant to the task that the 
authors set for themselves—namely, trying to ascertain how 
the justices themselves likely appraised the ideological 
affiliations of speakers and their speech. 
Some of the study’s problems may also be the result of 
the authors’ decision not to provide readers with a detailed 
description of the criteria they used when classifying 
speakers’ and speech’s ideologies.386 That surprising choice 
may have something to do with my inability to reproduce 
their assessments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. 
Yet even if they had provided a full description of their coding 
criteria, it seems clear that those criteria sometimes 
produced measures whose validity can readily be 
challenged.387 As I noted, for example, in earlier versions of 
their paper the authors revealed that they regarded “racist 
communication” and “racist behavior” as things that qualify 
a speaker for membership in conservative justices’ ideological 
in-group.388 In their short description of conservative 
speakers in the most recent version of their paper, they have 
replaced racists with pro-life advocates but have not 
disavowed their earlier treatment of racist expression.389 In 
my own judgment, the authors’ linkage between racism and 
conservative justices’ ideological in-group is quite stunning. 
It is one thing to believe (as many conservatives do), for 
example, that race-based affirmative action violates the 
Equal Protection Clause; it is quite another to associate with 
  
 385. See supra note 379 and accompanying text. 
 386. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text. 
 387. See supra Parts I.C, II. 
 388. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text. 
 389. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 10. 
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the Aryan Brotherhood, or to identify with a man who attacks 
a young boy because he is white, or to feel an ideological 
affinity with one who burns a cross in the yard of an African-
American family.390 
Looking ahead, the authors urge other researchers to join 
the search for in-group biases among judges and justices, 
both within the free-expression realm and beyond.391 That is 
a good proposal. As Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal 
write, “the rule of law requires judges to dispense justice 
without regard to the parties,”392 and prior, smaller studies 
(and perhaps even elements of this larger study) suggest that 
in-group biases do sometimes play a role in the way that 
courts adjudicate the disputes that come before them.393 The 
public is well served by information about how all of its 
branches of government are performing, and that certainly is 
no less true of the judiciary than it is of the political branches. 
Needless to say, however, the public is well served by 
information that can readily withstand reasonable criticism 
but ill-served by information that cannot.394 With the justices 
now reportedly voting along partisan lines to an 
unprecedented degree,395 the Court already invites cynicism 
  
 390. See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving 
those facts). 
 391. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 3, 16. 
 392. Id. at 16. 
 393. See, e.g., David S. Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of 
Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 374 (2012) (reporting that, in a study of state cases 
adjudicated in Cook County, Illinois, the gap between the lengths of sentences 
that white defendants and racial-minority defendants received was significantly 
reduced when the sentences were imposed by African-American judges); Moses 
Shayo & Asaf Zussman, Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism, 126 
Q. J. ECON. 1447, 1448-49 (2011) (reporting that, in a study of small-claims courts 
in Israel, Arab and Jewish judges tend to favor litigants who are members of their 
own ethnic groups, particularly when there is terroristic activity geographically 
and temporally close to the rulings). 
 394. Cf. Epstein & King, supra note 38, at 9 (“[R]egardless of the purpose, effect, 
or intended audience of the research, academics have an obligation to produce 
work that is reliable.”). 
 395. See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party 
Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court 1 (William & Mary 
Law School, Research Paper No. 09-276), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2432111. It bears noting that these authors, too, relied 
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among the larger public. As Adam Liptak noted in the New 
York Times several days after covering Professors Epstein, 
Parker, and Segal’s study, “[t]he perception that partisan 
politics has infected the court’s work may do lasting damage 
to its prestige and authority and to Americans’ faith in the 
rule of law.”396 The gravity of that risk makes it all the more 
important for those who study the Court to ensure that, when 
reporting findings that play squarely into the hands of those 
who are eager to dismiss a politically identifiable block of 
justices as opportunistic ideologues, those findings are as 
unimpeachable as one can reasonably make them.397 
The trickiest problem for future studies of justices’ 
ideological in-group biases is determining how to assign 
ideological identities to litigants in a manner that leaves one 
reasonably confident that the identities one assigns 
correspond to the identities that the justices perceived. After 
all, if a justice does not regard a litigant as a member of an 
ideological in-group or out-group, then the groundwork for 
manifesting an in-group bias has not been laid.398 Professors 
Epstein, Parker, and Segal got it exactly right when they 
wrote that “the two key inputs in [their] study” were “[t]he 
ideology of the Justices and the speakers.”399 Assigning 
ideological identities to the justices themselves is not as 
  
upon the Supreme Court Database and its coding of justices’ votes as conservative 
or liberal. See id. at 7 & n.21. As I have explained, that reliance evidently comes 
with significant baggage. See supra notes 373-80 and accompanying text.  
 396. Adam Liptak, The Polarized Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2014, at 
SR6. 
 397. Cf. Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 376, at 85 (“If we want to talk 
about whether we think the Justices get the balance between law and ideology 
right, then we have to know what balance they are in fact striking, when they 
allow ideology to dominate, and how other factors influence their decisions.”) 
(emphasis added). The risk I describe above is made even more acute by the fact 
that ideologically driven us-versus-them thinking appears to be on the rise as a 
general matter. See Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RES. CTR. 
FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (June 12, 2014), http://www.people-
press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public (“Republicans 
and Democrats are more divided along ideological lines—and partisan antipathy 
is deeper and more extensive—than at any point in the last two decades.”). 
 398. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 399. Summary, supra note 6, at 2. 
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difficult today as it once might have been: the Segal-Cover 
scores on which the study’s authors relied provide a plausible 
basis for carrying out that task.400 But researchers evidently 
have not yet developed a comparably defensible basis for 
assigning ideological identities to litigants when those 
identities are not already clear. I am skeptical about whether 
it can be satisfactorily done, but the task’s ultimate 
feasibility is for those who carry out these studies to 
determine in the first instance.401 
The authors’ explanation of how they determined 
speakers’ ideological affiliations—saying that anti-gay and 
pro-life speakers were classified as conservative, “students 
espousing liberal causes, war protestors burning American 
flags, [and] donors providing support to or associating with 
left-wing organizations” were classified as liberal, “and so 
on”402—relies upon obvious examples and deflects readers’ 
attention from the frequent difficulty of the task. Moreover, 
the authors’ apparent (but unelaborated) partial reliance 
upon the Supreme Court Database’s coding protocols 
evidently does not suffice to yield a high rate of 
uncontroversial results. As I have illustrated, there are many 
litigants to whom the study’s authors assigned ideological 
identities that are either wrong or reasonably debatable.403 So 
long as those identities remain open to question, one cannot 
be confident that one knows how those litigants were 
perceived by the justices themselves. Until those who study 
ideological in-group bias develop a means of surmounting 
  
 400. See supra note 8. 
 401. I would imagine that the ideal method would shun classifying litigants in 
binary fashion as either conservative or liberal, but instead would place litigants 
on a spectrum that is sensitive to degrees of ideological tilt. For examples of 
researchers’ efforts to find nuanced ways to measure ideology-laden phenomena 
in other legal settings, see Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking the Measure of 
Ideology: Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases, 98 GEO. L.J. 1, passim 
(2009) (developing ways to measure case outcomes that are more nuanced than 
simply classifying those outcomes in binary fashion as either “liberal” or 
“conservative”); Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 376, at 129-33 
(suggesting means by which to measure a case’s “ideological salience” for the 
justices). 
 402. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 10. 
 403. See supra Parts I.C, II. 
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that difficulty, researchers are presented with a choice: they 
can either reduce the size of their data pools, retaining only 
those cases in which litigants’ ideological identities are clear, 
or produce studies that might unjustifiably inflame those 
whose own in-group biases predispose them to embrace the 
results. The former seems the better path; the fires of 
cynicism and partisanship already burn well enough on their 
own. 
*  *  *  *  *  * 
On September 30, 2014, shortly after I posted an earlier 
version of this Article on SSRN, Professors Epstein, Parker, 
and Segal posted a brief reply, conceding a handful of errors 
but otherwise declining to budge.404 I have noted instances in 
which the authors’ explanations of their coding decisions 
unfortunately make it even clearer that they misunderstood 
the facts of some of the cases they were coding.405 There are 
larger points about the authors’ response, however, that may 
usefully be made. First, at least at the time of this writing 
(October 2014), one will search their response materials in 
vain for a comprehensive list of their coding criteria. That 
strangely enduring lacuna is difficult to explain on terms 
favorable to the study, particularly given the insistence in 
2002 of the study’s lead author—in the context of sharply 
criticizing other scholars’ work—that the public presentation 
of such a list is an indispensable feature of good empirical 
scholarship.406 It is clear that the Supreme Court Database’s 
coding criteria provided the authors with their start, but it 
also is clear that they supplemented those criteria with 
judgments of their own. 
Second, recall that the authors erroneously included at 
least three cases that had nothing to do with First 
Amendment expressive freedoms—the area of law in which 
the authors said they were assessing the justices’ tendencies 
toward ideological in-group bias.407 The authors tersely 
  
 404. See Lee Epstein et al., A Response to a Critique of Our Study on In-Group 
Bias (Sept. 30, 2014), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBiasResponse.
pdf [hereinafter Response]. 
 405. See, e.g., supra notes 132-42, 245-49 and accompanying text. 
 406. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. 
 407. See supra Part II.A. 
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dismissed that criticism, and in the process they revealed an 
orientation that goes a long way toward explaining some of 
the study’s other weaknesses. Here is what they wrote: 
[H]e asserts that three cases shouldn’t be in our study because he 
doesn’t think they implicate freedom of expression. What he thinks, 
though, wasn’t our definition for inclusion. We selected cases based 
on the Supreme Court Database’s issue area definitions. Now the 
author might not like these definitions. That’s fine; he’s free to 
write his own and then go through all the Supreme Court’s 
decisions since 1953 to determine the cases that do and do not meet 
his new definition. But he’s not free to condemn our work for failing 
to meet his self-imposed definition (whatever it might be).408 
Even apart from the angry bluster, that is a discouraging 
but telling response. I would have thought that a case merits 
inclusion in a study purporting to focus entirely on First 
Amendment expressive freedoms only if that case concerns 
First Amendment expressive freedoms. My definition was no 
more “new” or “self-imposed” than that; indeed, it is identical 
to the definition that the authors themselves explicitly 
provided when they wrote that “[h]ere and throughout the 
paper, we focus exclusively on the First Amendment 
guarantees of speech, press, assembly, and association.”409 
Anyone who reads those three cases will see that they had 
nothing to do with First Amendment claims of speech, press, 
assembly, association, or petition. Yet in the authors’ 
judgment, we are to ignore that fact because the Supreme 
Court Database told the authors that those cases were 
relevant to their study. At some point, obeisance to the 
Supreme Court Database must reach its limits, giving way to 
what those who take the time to read the Court’s cases can 
unambiguously see for themselves. In the meantime, there is 
nothing impertinent about pointing out ways in which 
researchers have misapprehended the facts. 
There are more important things at stake here than 
merely the coding of those three cases. The orientation that 
the authors have now made explicit bears upon other 
problems in their study. Was the goal here to study in-group 
bias in First Amendment free-expression cases, based upon 
one’s best effort to identify the justices’ own in-group and out-
  
 408. Epstein et al., Response, supra note 404, at 1.  
 409. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 2 n.6 (emphasis added). 
2015] EPSTEIN-PARKER-SEGAL CRITIQUE 81 
group assessments of the free-expression claimants who 
appeared before them, or was it instead to see what the 
Supreme Court Database would say when asked a question? 
If agreement is elusive on that seemingly fundamental point, 
then there is little reason to be optimistic about reaching 
agreement on more subtle but nevertheless similarly 
important matters, such as the degree to which the authors’ 
coding criteria—some of which remain undisclosed—can be 
trusted to accurately capture the justices’ own in-group and 
out-group assessments of ideologically nuanced cases. 
The issue for future researchers in the area of in-group 
bias is whether the authors’ design, execution, presentation, 
and defense of this particular study are worthy of close 
emulation. The public deserves a thoughtful answer to that 
question. 
APPENDIX 
I reviewed the authors’ treatment of all cases decided 
between 1987 and the close of their study’s time period, 
amounting to 30% of the more than 500 cases they included. 
In that review, I examined the authors’ ideological 
classifications of those cases’ First Amendment claimants 
and the authors’ coding of Chief Justice Roberts’s, Justice 
Scalia’s, and Justice Alito’s votes. Of the 159 cases I 
reviewed, I found one or more errors or readily debatable 
judgments in 40 cases, or in 25% of those I examined. 
The following table lists in chronological order the cases 
in which I found problems. In the right-hand column, an “A” 
signifies that the case had nothing to do with the freedom of 
expression; a “B” signifies that the authors miscoded the vote 
of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and/or Justice Scalia; 
a “C” indicates that the authors likely erred when assigning 
an ideological classification to the case; a “D” indicates cases 
in which, even if one cannot confidently say that the authors 
erred, one can easily question whether the authors’ 
ideological classifications accurately captured how the 
justices themselves assessed the First Amendment 
claimants’ ideological in-group or out-group status; an “E” 
denotes cases in which it is difficult to imagine any justice 
regarding the speakers as members of his or her own 
ideological in-group; and an “F” signifies that the authors 
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double-counted a speaker who appeared twice before the 
Court during the course of the same litigation. 
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 * In the two cases marked with both a C and a D, I argue that the authors 
either erred by assigning a single ideological identity to a coalition of ideologically 
diverse speakers, erred by assigning an ideological classification to speech in the 
absence of a persuasive reason to believe that the justices themselves placed that 
speech in one ideological category rather than the other, or made an undefended 
assumption that, for a justice driven by ideological in-group bias, the ideological 
tenor of the speech matters more than the usual ideological affiliation of the 
speaker. For more, see supra Parts I.C, II.C, II.E. 
